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DEMENTIA, AUTONOMY, AND SUPPORTED HEALTHCARE 
DECISIONMAKING 
MEGAN S. WRIGHT* 
ABSTRACT 
 Healthcare providers often rely on surrogates to decide on be-
half of their patients with dementia who are deemed incapable of 
exercising autonomy.  There is a longstanding debate about the 
appropriate standard of surrogate healthcare decisionmaking for 
these patients.  Many influential scholars argue that the precedent 
autonomy of the person with dementia should be respected, and 
healthcare decision-making laws generally reflect this principle.  
These laws direct surrogate decisionmakers to follow instructions 
in living wills or to decide on the basis of the wishes and values of 
the person before the onset of dementia. But other prominent schol-
ars have questioned whether surrogates should instead use the best 
interests standard, which accounts for the current interests of the 
person with dementia. 
 This debate about decision-making standards ignores an argua-
bly more important issue: who should be deciding?  Empirical re-
search demonstrates that persons with mild dementia retain the 
ability to make or participate in decisions despite their acquired 
cognitive impairments, and that they prefer to be actively involved 
in healthcare decisionmaking.  However, persons with dementia 
                                                          
© 2020 Megan S. Wright 
* Megan S. Wright, J.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Law, Medicine, and Sociology and 
Affiliate Faculty at The Rock Ethics Institute at The Pennsylvania State University and Adjunct 
Assistant Professor of Medical Ethics in Medicine at Weill Cornell Medical College.  An earlier 
version of this Article was presented at the 2018 Health Law Scholars Workshop, and I would like 
to thank Erin Bakanas, Harold Braswell, Jesse Goldner, Nina Kohn, and Elizabeth Pendo for their 
in-depth feedback.  I would also like to thank the other attendees for their insightful questions and 
comments: Liz Chiarello, Rob Gatter, Sam Halabi, Diane Hoffman, Fred Rotnek, Sidney Watson, 
and Ruqaiijah Yearby.  An earlier version of this Article was also presented at the Penn State 2018 
Bioethics Colloquium, and I would like to thank participants, specifically Liana Glew, Jonathan 
Marks, and Donald Thompson.  An earlier version of this Article was also presented at Emory Law, 
and I would like to thank the faculty for feedback, specifically Martha Fineman.  Additionally, an 
earlier version of this Article was presented at the 19th Annual American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities Meeting.  In its earliest stages, this research also benefitted immensely from conversa-
tions with Abbe Gluck and Stephen Latham, and in-depth feedback from Daniel Markovits.  I would 
also like to thank Cindy Cain for her feedback on this work in its various forms.  I am also thankful 
for the Maryland Law Review staff’s excellent feedback and editing. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354545
    
258 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:257 
are routinely marginalized in the decision-making process, which 
leads to a decline in their psychological wellbeing. 
 Based on studies of their decision-making abilities, preferences, 
and experiences, this Article will argue that persons with dementia 
should not be prevented from making their own healthcare deci-
sions.  Stated differently, persons with dementia should have the 
legal right to make their own healthcare decisions at the time when 
the decisions need to be made.  Ensuring this right will require 
looking beyond surrogate-based healthcare decision-making law, 
which facilitates the exclusion of persons with dementia from de-
cisionmaking. 
 Disability law in six U.S. jurisdictions provides an alternative 
decision-making model, known as supported decisionmaking, 
which empowers persons with cognitive impairments to make their 
own decisions and could be usefully applied to dementia.  In sup-
ported decisionmaking, an adult with a disability (the “principal”) 
voluntarily chooses people to assist them in decisionmaking (a 
“supporter”) and formalizes this arrangement in a written agree-
ment.  The supporter’s role is to help the principal gather relevant 
information, think through the decision, and convey the decision to 
other people.  Supported decisionmaking preserves the legal deci-
sion-making authority of a person with a disability rather than 
transferring such authority to a surrogate.  Because supported de-
cisionmaking accords with the preferences and interests of persons 
with dementia, supported decision-making laws should be widely 
adopted. 
 This novel application of supported decisionmaking to dementia 
also provides insight into the nature of autonomy in the larger con-
text of late-life healthcare decisionmaking.  My past research has 
demonstrated that autonomous decisionmaking in this context is 
relational, which is consistent with supported decisionmaking.  
This Article will further build upon this conceptualization and ad-
vance a new understanding of autonomy in healthcare deci-
sionmaking as more closely approximating relational agency.  
With this revised understanding of autonomy and the adoption of 
supported decisionmaking, persons with dementia can remain au-
tonomous for longer in the progression of their disease. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a longstanding debate in the law and philosophy literature, and 
in medical practice and clinical scholarship, about dementia and deci-
sionmaking.  Dementia is a degenerative disorder that, over time, results in 
significant cognitive decline and the need for assistance with activities of 
daily living.  Assistance is also sometimes needed when making medical de-
cisions, and surrogate (i.e., substitute) decisionmakers are often relied upon.  
The use of surrogate decisionmaking for persons with dementia leads to ques-
tions about how surrogates should make decisions.  Many influential scholars 
argue the precedent autonomy of the person with dementia should be re-
spected,1 and healthcare decision-making law generally reflects this principle 
by instructing surrogates to follow instructions in living wills or to decide on 
                                                          
 1.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 222–29 (1993).  
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the basis of the prior wishes and values of the person with dementia.2  But 
other prominent scholars have questioned whether the best interests standard, 
which accounts for current interests and preferences even if they conflict with 
past wishes, should instead be the default for this population.3 
An example that illustrates the tension over decision-making standards 
concerns the “happy demented patient” whose current experiential interests 
seem to conflict with their interests prior to the onset of dementia.4  Many 
versions of this example circulate in philosophical scholarship, but the main 
features are the following: An individual has a legally binding advance di-
rective that instructs that life-sustaining treatment be withheld should they 
develop dementia.  They then acquire dementia, progressing to the point in 
their illness where they have moderate cognitive decline, but seem to be con-
tent, experience pleasure, and are capable of expressing a fear of dying.  Then 
they encounter further health problems, and healthcare providers and surro-
gate decisionmakers consult their advance directive to decide whether a low-
burden life-sustaining intervention, such as an antibiotic, should be adminis-
tered.5  Healthcare decision-making law, premised on respect for autonomy, 
directs surrogate decisionmakers to follow the advance directive and decline 
the life-saving intervention.  Allowing the person with dementia to die in 
order to respect an abstract principle may cause moral distress to surrogates 
and healthcare professionals, however, because doing so does not necessarily 
seem to be in the current best interest of the patient, which is to continue 
living a content, pleasurable life.6 
This Article will step back from the ongoing and perhaps irresolvable 
debates about which surrogate decision-making standards are ethically supe-
rior to engage a question that is logically prior: Should persons with dementia 
                                                          
 2.  See, e.g., UNIF. HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT prefatory note (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1994) [hereinafter UHCDA].   
 3.  E.g., Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and 
Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (1986) [hereinafter Dresser, Life, Death, and In-
competent Patients]; Rebecca Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Pa-
tients, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 609 (1994) [hereinafter Dresser, Missing Persons]; Rebecca Dresser, 
Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823 
(2003) [hereinafter Dresser, Precommitment].  In the absence of an advance directive, the best in-
terests standard is used in some states when a patient lacks capacity.  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-36-1-5(d) (LexisNexis 2016).  This standard is a last resort for states that privilege substituted 
judgments.  UHCDA, supra note 2, § 2(e). 
 4.  See TIA POWELL, DEMENTIA REIMAGINED: BUILDING A LIFE OF JOY AND DIGNITY FROM 
BEGINNING TO END 257–58 (2019); Deena S. Davis, Advance Directives and Alzheimer’s Disease, 
46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 744, 746–47 (2018); Dresser, Missing Persons, supra note 3, at 624–25; 
Jennifer Hawkins, Well-Being, Time, and Dementia, 124 ETHICS 507–08 (2014); see also Agnieszka 
Jaworska, Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity to Value, 28 
PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 105, 107 (1999) (describing a sad demented patient). 
 5.  Hawkins, supra note 4, at 508; see also Paul T. Menzel & Bonnie Steinbock, Advance 
Directives, Dementia, and Physician-Assisted Death, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 484 (2013). 
 6.  Davis, supra note 4, at 746–47. 
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be legally entitled to make their own healthcare decisions at the time a deci-
sion needs to be made?  Grounded in the lived experiences and decision-
making preferences of persons with dementia, this Article will answer in the 
affirmative. 
Indeed, what is often missing in the extant legal and bioethics scholar-
ship on dementia and decisionmaking is the perspective of persons with de-
mentia.7  Empirical literature demonstrates that persons with dementia prefer 
to be actively involved in decisions that affect their lives, but often are mar-
ginalized, ignored, or excluded from the decision-making process.8  This is 
true even in the early stages of dementia, when significant cognitive abilities 
remain and persons are capable of participating.9  Being prevented from mak-
ing or participating in decisions has a negative impact on the wellbeing of 
persons with dementia who report feeling that they are not recognized as peo-
ple, but instead are treated as objects.10 
This Article is the first to engage in depth with whether the practice of 
permitting surrogates to make healthcare decisions for persons with demen-
tia, which is facilitated by healthcare decision-making law, should be 
changed.  To date, reference to persons with dementia making their own 
healthcare decisions in legal and bioethical scholarship tends to be brief and 
conclusory in nature.11  Advice for lawyers who have clients with dementia 
similarly lacks acknowledgement that persons with dementia may be able to 
make their own healthcare decisions at the time they need to be made.12  The 
focus is instead on how to ensure that others make good decisions on behalf 
of the person with dementia. 
                                                          
 7.  The goal of many legal academics and bioethicists writing in this area is to identify legal 
tools by which to avoid living with dementia, a condition they consider intolerably degrading.  Cli-
nicians and social scientists are more likely to foreground the perspectives of persons with dementia. 
 8.  See, e.g., Lyndsey M. Miller et al., Shared Decision-Making in Dementia: A Review of 
Patient and Family Carer Involvement, 15 DEMENTIA 1141, 1142–43 (2016). 
 9.  Persons with dementia are, therefore, excluded even when they are legally entitled to make 
their own decisions because they retain decisional capacity.  See infra Sections I.B, I.C, and IV.A.1. 
 10.  See, e.g., Alison Phinney, Living with the Symptoms of Alzheimer’s Disease, in THE 
PERSON WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE: PATHWAYS TO UNDERSTANDING THE EXPERIENCE 49 
(Phyllis Braudy Harris ed., 2002); Rosalie F. Young, Medical Experiences and Concerns of People 
with Alzheimer’s Disease, in THE PERSON WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE, supra, at 29, 38–41, 44. 
 11.  See, e.g., Chris Fox et al., Clinical Management of Dementia: An Overview (2), in THE 
LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA 65, 81 (Charles Foster et al. eds., 2014) (“A whole chapter or more 
could be devoted to the discussion on involving patients in decision making.  We merely note . . . 
that ‘treatment and care should take into account patients’ needs and preferences and patients should 
have the opportunity to make informed decisions about their care and treatment, in partnership with 
their healthcare professionals.’”); see also Rebekah Diller, Legal Capacity for All: Including Older 
Persons in the Shift from Adult Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 43 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 495 (2016) (focusing on older adults, but occasionally discussing Alzheimer’s Dementia).   
 12.  KERRY PECK & RICK L. LAW, ALZHEIMER’S AND THE LAW: COUNSELING CLIENTS WITH 
DEMENTIA AND THEIR FAMILIES 74 (2013). 
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This oversight is surprising given that international and domestic disa-
bility law provides an alternative decision-making model—known as sup-
ported decisionmaking—that empowers persons with cognitive disabilities to 
make their own decisions.13  Supported decisionmaking preserves the legal 
decision-making authority of a person with a disability rather than transfer-
ring such authority to a surrogate.  Under this model, an adult with a disability 
(the “principal”) voluntarily chooses people to assist them in decisionmaking 
(a “supporter”), and may formalize this arrangement in a written agreement.14  
The supporter’s role is to help the principal gather relevant information, think 
through the decision, and convey the decision to other people.15  In contrast 
to the emphasis on autonomy in healthcare decision-making law, supported 
decisionmaking emphasizes agency, self-determination, respect for person-
hood, bodily integrity, and relationships with others.  Supported deci-
sionmaking originated for persons with developmental and intellectual disa-
bilities and is currently being explored for persons with mental illnesses.16 
Given that dementia is a disability,17 applying decision-making models 
found in disability law rather than healthcare decision-making law may be 
beneficial in identifying the best decision-making practices for this popula-
tion.  The emphasis on decisional capacity in healthcare decision-making 
law, coupled with presumptions of incompetence that begin upon diagnosis 
of dementia,18 allow others to disregard the agency of the person with de-
mentia and take over decisionmaking.  In order to improve their wellbeing, 
persons with dementia who prefer to make or participate in decisions should 
not be prevented from doing so, especially in the context of healthcare deci-
sionmaking that affects what happens to their body and whether they live or 
die.19  Under a legally enforceable supported decision-making agreement, 
persons with dementia would be assured of a legal entitlement to make their 
                                                          
 13.  Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 
117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2013). 
 14.  See, e.g., TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.051(1)–(4) (West 2018). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See, e.g., PIERS GOODING, A NEW ERA FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY: 
SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AND THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES (2017); Dilip V. Jeste et al., Supported Decision Making in Serious Mental Illness, 81 
PSYCHIATRY: INTERPERSONAL & BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 28, 28–29 (2018). 
 17.  The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) defines disability as “(A) a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as de-
scribed in paragraph (3)).”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012). 
 18.  RENEE BEARD, LIVING WITH ALZHEIMER’S: MANAGING MEMORY LOSS, IDENTITY, AND 
ILLNESS 63, 82–83, 109–110 (2016). 
 19.  Healthcare decisions are especially important because the consequences of these decisions 
affect all other decisions.  Decisions such as where to live (e.g., whether to move to an assisted 
living facility) also matter to persons with dementia.  But unlike healthcare decisions that primarily 
affect the person with dementia (whose body bears the costs and benefits of the decision), other 
types of decisions may affect third parties whose interests are appropriate to consider.   
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own decisions should this be their preference.  Supported decisionmaking is 
thus consistent with the interests of persons with dementia, who desire to be 
viewed as people capable of exercising agency. 
Therefore, if institutionalized as a legal alternative to surrogate deci-
sionmaking, supported decisionmaking would likely increase wellbeing for 
persons with dementia.  Further, supported decisionmaking would increase 
the likelihood that persons with dementia could remain autonomous for 
longer in the progression of their disease, if autonomy is appropriately un-
derstood. 
Indeed, this Article is the second in a series that relies upon the lived 
experiences of people facing late- and end-of-life decisionmaking to argue 
that traditional conceptualizations of autonomy in health law require revision.  
The first article in this series demonstrated that, in contrast to the dominant 
understanding of autonomy as individualistic, most people understand auton-
omy to be relational; that is, they make end-of-life decisions with others and 
perhaps even on the basis of others’ interests, and still view themselves as 
autonomous decisionmakers.20  Additionally, the earlier article argued that 
healthcare decision-making laws meant to effectuate autonomy may actually 
hinder it because such laws are premised on a “derelationalized” understand-
ing of autonomy.21 
This Article will use the case of dementia to build upon my previous 
arguments about autonomy in healthcare decisionmaking in several ways.  
First, I will argue that dementia is not necessarily incompatible with auton-
omy, and that persons with mild to moderate dementia are capable of auton-
omous decisionmaking, if autonomy is properly conceptualized as relational.  
Indeed, if persons with dementia can make healthcare decisions in consulta-
tion and collaboration with supporters they have selected, this would be con-
sistent with how persons without dementia prefer to make important deci-
sions.  Supported decisionmaking formalizes how many people prefer to 
decide, regardless of whether they have a disability that impairs cognition.  
Using supported rather than surrogate decisionmaking thus promotes rela-
tional autonomy. 
Second, this Article will demonstrate that the existing literature on the 
relationship between dementia and autonomy obscures an important reality: 
Persons with dementia retain significant cognitive capabilities despite their 
impairments, and persons without dementia often do not act autonomously.22  
Indeed, autonomous decisionmaking as defined in much of the philosophical 
                                                          
 20.  Megan S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The Case for Relational Nudges in End-of-
Life Decision-Making Law and Policy, 77 MD. L. REV. 1062, 1093 (2018). 
 21.  Id. at 1100. 
 22.  Id. at 1096–1101. 
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literature23 may be impossible even for persons without dementia.  This is 
because cognitive biases distort rationality and prevent people from making 
decisions that further their interests, and because structural factors, such as 
poverty, limit available choices.24  It is thus more accurate to describe most 
decisionmaking as agentic.  So described, agentic decisions are also possible 
for persons with dementia who, in the early to middle stages, remain able to 
communicate preferences and make choices,25 and with support could make 
decisions that align with their preferences, interests, and values.  If equality 
is valued, then instead of privileging an idealized version of autonomy in law 
and medicine, which even persons without cognitive impairments cannot 
meet and which results in disparate treatment of persons with dementia, the 
decisions of all who can decide agentically should be respected. 
The Article will proceed in four parts.  In Part I, a brief orientation to 
dementia will provide basic familiarity with the features of this disability.  
This Part will also summarize surrogate healthcare decision-making law, 
which is often applied to persons with dementia.  This Part will conclude by 
describing the decision-making preferences of persons with dementia and 
will demonstrate that existing law and clinical practice do not accord with 
these preferences.  Part II will argue that law and practice should better align 
with the preferences of persons with dementia, in order to respect their 
agency and increase their wellbeing.  Part III will describe supported deci-
sionmaking, which is more consistent with the interests of persons with de-
mentia than surrogate decisionmaking, and argue that this model should be 
widely adopted.  Part IV will evaluate the scope conditions of and address 
possible objections to persons with dementia using supported decisionmak-
ing.  This Article will conclude with a discussion of how autonomy should 
be reconceptualized in healthcare decision-making law, advancing the con-
cept of relational agency. 
I.  LIVING AND MAKING HEALTHCARE DECISIONS WITH DEMENTIA 
Millions of people are affected by dementia, including the estimated 
four to five million Americans who have some type of dementia and their 
family members.26  The question of how to provide appropriate care for per-
sons with dementia is a pressing health policy question as the numbers of 
                                                          
 23.  TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 104 
(7th ed. 2013) (defining “autonomous action in terms of normal choosers who act (1) intentionally, 
(2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences that determine their action”). 
 24.  Wright, supra note 20, at 1096–1101; see also Susan Sherwin, Relational Autonomy and 
Global Threats, in BEING RELATIONAL: REFLECTIONS ON RELATIONAL THEORY AND HEALTH 
LAW 13 (Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer L. Llewellyn eds. 2012). 
 25.  See, e.g., Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1142–43. 
 26.  Gina Kolata, U.S. Dementia Rates Are Dropping Even as Population Ages, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/health/dementia-rates-united-
states.html?_r=0. 
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persons with dementia increase,27 and there is still no cure or prevention for 
dementia.28 
In order to provide an orientation to the issue of dementia and healthcare 
decisionmaking, this Part first defines and describes dementia.  It then out-
lines the law governing healthcare decisionmaking for persons with impaired 
decisional capacity, which includes persons with dementia.  Finally, this Part 
concludes by summarizing the empirical literature on the healthcare decision-
making abilities, preferences, and experiences of persons with dementia. 
A.  Definition and Epidemiology of Dementia 
Dementia is an umbrella term that refers to a variety of neuropsychiatric 
conditions that impair cognitive functions.29  Put simply, “[d]ementia is a 
syndrome, usually of a chronic or progressive nature, caused by a variety of 
brain illnesses that affect memory, thinking, behaviour and ability to perform 
everyday activities.”30  Alzheimer’s dementia (“AD”) is the most common 
dementia, accounting for over sixty percent of all cases.31  Other common 
types of dementia include vascular dementia, dementia with Lewy bodies, 
and frontotemporal dementia.32  Dementia also can be caused by Parkinson’s 
disease, Huntington’s disease, multiple sclerosis, traumatic brain injury, and 
other conditions.33  
                                                          
 27.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., DEMENTIA: A PUBLIC HEALTH PRIORITY (2012), 
https://www.who.int/mental_health/publications/dementia_report_2012/en/. 
 28.  Id. at 8. 
 29.  What is Dementia?, NAT’L INSTITUTE ON AGING, https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/what-
dementia; see also Elissa L. Ash, What is Dementia?, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA, supra 
note 11, at 3, 3–5.  
 30.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 2, 7.  There are many different definitions of 
dementia in the clinical literature, but for a comprehensive definition that covers dementia due to 
all causes see Guy M. McKhann et al., The Diagnosis of Dementia Due to Alzheimer’s Disease: 
Recommendations from the National Institute on Aging-Alzheimer’s Association Workgroups on 
Diagnostic Guidelines for Alzheimer’s Disease, 7 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 263 (2011); see also 
Ash, supra note 29, at 4–5. 
 31.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 7; see also MICHAEL CASTLEMAN ET AL., 
THERE’S STILL A PERSON IN THERE: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO TREATING AND COPING WITH 
ALZHEIMER’S 30–31 (1999) (describing warning signs of Alzheimer’s). 
 32.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 19.  “Early in the disease course these different 
types of dementia can impair specific cognitive processes, such as memory, language, behavior, or 
executive functions, but all types of dementia can impair decision making.”  R. Ryan Darby & 
Bradford C. Dickerson, Dementia, Decision-Making, and Capacity, 25 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 
270, 270 (2017). 
 33.  CASTLEMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 125–44; Ash, supra note 29, at 9. 
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Just as there are different types of dementia, there are different degrees 
of dementia as well.  Dementia can be classified as mild, moderate, or se-
vere;34 most persons with dementia have mild dementia, and less than a quar-
ter of persons with dementia have severe dementia.35  Someone with mild 
dementia may have problems doing “complex tasks”36 they used to do with 
ease such as “bill paying, cooking, housecleaning, and traveling.”37  Or a 
person may lose the ability to write, but can still think and speak in a manner 
that conveys sophisticated thoughts.38  A person with moderate dementia may 
require a more significant amount of assistance with daily activities such as 
maintaining hygiene and getting dressed, and, while retaining verbal abilities 
and the ability to engage in activities such as eating and painting, may evi-
dence severe memory deficits and be unable to read.39  A person in the later 
stages of dementia may be incontinent, nonverbal, and unable to eat without 
assistance or artificial nutrition and hydration.40  Persons with late stage de-
mentia may also have psychiatric symptoms, which “may include paranoia, 
delusions, hallucinations, agitation, restlessness and socially inappropriate or 
aggressive behavior.”41  The experience of dementia also depends on an in-
dividual’s prior psychological characteristics42 and their current social envi-
ronment.43  
                                                          
 34.  McKhann et al., supra note 30, at 265; see also CASTLEMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 38–
40 (describing stages of dementia); Ash, supra note 29, at 4; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, 
at 7 (describing common symptoms of dementia by early, middle, and late stages). 
 35.  POWELL, supra note 4, at 213 (“Mild to moderate dementia lasts for years . . . .”); Menzel 
& Steinbock, supra note 5, at 486 (citing statistics). 
 36.  See ANNE KENNY, MAKING TOUGH DECISIONS ABOUT END-OF-LIFE CARE IN DEMENTIA 
16–17 (2018); see also CASTLEMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 39. 
 37.  Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 5, at 486 (citing the Functional Assessment Staging Test 
(“FAST”)).   
 38.  See id. at 492 (describing a case of early stage AD). 
 39.  See, e.g., id. at 486 (describing moderate dementia); see also KENNY, supra note 36 (de-
scribing symptoms at Stage 5 to 6C of the FAST scale); Paul T. Menzel & Colette Chandler-Cramer, 
Advance Directives, Dementia, and Withholding Food and Water by Mouth, HASTINGS CTR. REP., 
May–June 2014, at 23, 27 (describing a woman with moderate dementia). 
 40.  See, e.g., KENNY, supra note 36 (describing symptoms at Stages 6d to 7f of the FAST 
scale); Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 5, at 486; Menzel & Chandler-Cramer, supra note 39, at 23 
(describing a person with late-stage dementia). 
 41.  Patrick P. Coll, Legal and Ethical Issues at the End-of-Life: Dementia, 23 QUINNIPIAC 
PROB. L.J. 378, 383 (2010). 
 42.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 7. 
 43.  TOM KITWOOD, DEMENTIA RECONSIDERED, REVISITED: THE PERSON STILL COMES FIRST 
84–85 (Dawn Brooker ed., 2d. ed. 2019) (arguing that all dementia experiences are unique); see 
also POWELL, supra note 4, at 212–14 (arguing for altering the environment to try to make life with 
dementia as pleasant as possible). 
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Separate from but related to dementia is the diagnostic category of mild 
cognitive impairment (“MCI”).  MCI may be a precursor to AD, but the in-
dividual does not yet meet the clinical standard for a diagnosis of AD.44  A 
diagnosis of MCI requires: “concern about a change in cognition, in compar-
ison with the person’s previous level”; “lower performance in one or more 
cognitive domains that is greater than would be expected for the patient’s age 
and educational background”; “mild problems performing complex func-
tional tasks which they used to perform previously”; and “cognitive 
changes . . .  sufficiently mild [such] that there is no evidence of a significant 
impairment in social or occupational functioning.”45  Not everyone who has 
MCI will develop dementia.46 
The onset of dementia typically occurs in later life,47 and as the number 
of older persons in a society increases, there will be more people living with 
dementia.48  In the United States, the estimated rate of dementia from all 
causes for people over sixty is 6.77%,49 and AD is the sixth leading cause of 
death.50  While the rate of dementia is decreasing, the number of people living 
with dementia is rapidly increasing,51 as are the costs associated with provid-
ing dementia-related care.52  Dementia patients currently make up about fifty 
percent of all nursing home residents, about forty percent of residential care 
community residents, and about thirty percent of adult day services center 
participants.53  In response to this public health problem, recent legislation 
known as the BOLD Act (Building Our Largest Dementia Infrastructure for 
                                                          
 44.  Marilyn S. Albert et al., The Diagnosis of Mild Cognitive Impairment Due to Alzheimer’s 
Disease: Recommendations from the National Institute on Aging-Alzheimer’s Association 
Workgroups on Diagnostic Standards for Alzheimer’s Disease, 7 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 270 
(2011); Ash, supra note 29, at 5–6; Jennifer N. Vega & Paul A. Newhouse, Mild Cognitive Impair-
ment: Diagnosis, Longitudinal Course, and Emerging Treatments, 16 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP. 
490 (2014). 
 45.  Albert et al., supra note 44, at 271–72. 
 46.  Ash, supra note 29, at 6. 
 47.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 12, 15.  Fewer than ten percent of people with 
dementia are under age sixty-five.  Id. at 8.   
 48.  Israel Doron, The Demographics of Dementia, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA, 
supra note 11, at 15, 18.  
 49.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 14. 
 50.  Alzheimer’s Disease Fact Sheet, NAT’L INST. ON AGING, 
https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/alzheimers-disease-fact-sheet (last reviewed May 22, 2019); see 
also Robert H. Blank, Alzheimer’s Disease—Perspective from Political Science: Public Policy Is-
sues, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 724, 727 (2018) (noting that this statistic is likely an underestimate). 
 51.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at vi, 2, 8, 90. 
 52.  Blank, supra note 50, at 727–28; WORLD HEALTH ORG., at 2, 8, 25–28, 90. 
 53.  Alzheimer Disease, NAT’L CTR. HEALTH STAT., https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/alz-
heimers.htm (last reviewed Mar. 11, 2016). 
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Alzheimer’s Act)54 was recently signed into federal law and is meant to spur 
research into prevention and detection of dementia.55 
Given the interactions between type and stage of dementia, in combina-
tion with the unique individual and social characteristics of persons with de-
mentia (e.g., level of family support and education), persons with dementia 
will experience their disability differently.56  The universal parts of the expe-
rience of dementia are limited to the onset of a cognitive impairment, and the 
new relevance of laws that permit others to make decisions on behalf of per-
sons with dementia.57 
B.  Law of Healthcare Decisionmaking for Persons with Impaired 
Decisional Capacity 
Respect for autonomy is the foundation of health law and ethics.  Be-
cause of this principle, adults have the legal right to make their own 
healthcare decisions, provided they have not been adjudicated incompetent 
or been found by a clinician to lack decision-making capacity.  If a person is 
found to lack the capacity to consent to medical treatment, however, then the 
law provides a process for surrogate decisionmakers to decide on their behalf, 
using the patient’s values, beliefs, and preferences to guide their decision in 
order to respect the prior autonomy of the presently incapacitated patient.  
Because dementia often affects decision-making abilities, physicians and 
judges rely on surrogate decisionmakers when a healthcare decision needs to 
be made for a person with dementia.  This Section describes surrogate 
healthcare decision-making law in the United States. 
1.  Surrogate Decisionmaking and Dementia 
To effectuate respect for patient autonomy that survives a loss of deci-
sion-making capacity, all states have healthcare decision-making laws de-
signed to facilitate decisions made on the basis of the incapacitated person’s 
prior wishes.  For example, competent persons can use a power of attorney 
to designate an agent to make decisions for them in the event of future inca-
                                                          
 54.  Pub. L. No. 115-406, 132 Stat. 5362 (2018). 
 55.  Howard Gleckman, The Anti-Alzheimer’s BOLD Act Isn’t.  But It Could Be A Step in The 
Right Direction, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleck-
man/2019/01/09/the-anti-alzheimers-bold-act-isnt-but-it-could-be-a-step-in-the-right-direc-
tion/#33ddb35ba56d. 
 56.  KITWOOD, supra note 43, at 84–85. 
 57.  Another universal experience is that of stigma.  Nancy Berlinger & Mildred Z. Solomon, 
Becoming Good Citizens of Aging Societies, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.–Oct. 2018, at S2, S7 
(“Dementia is the most feared, stigmatized, and costly age-associated condition.”); Tia Powell, 
“Tho’ Much Is Taken, Much Abides”: A Good Life Within Dementia, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP., 
Sept.–Oct. 2018, at S71. 
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pacity.  People can also write a living will that provides decision-making in-
structions for surrogate decisionmakers to follow should the individual be 
unable to make their own decisions.58 
Physicians rather than judges typically find that a person lacks the ca-
pacity to make their own healthcare decisions,59 a finding that then triggers 
reliance on advance directives and use of surrogates.  When a patient’s deci-
sion-making capacity is in question, as may be the case when a person has 
dementia or other conditions that impair cognition, a trained provider may 
conduct a formal capacity assessment.60  This assessment “involves deter-
mining an individual’s ability to understand and retain relevant information, 
appreciate the nature and consequences of the decision and express [their] 
decision.”61  A person may have capacity to make some types of decisions 
but not others, and capacity is “decision-specific,” or varies by decision, and 
                                                          
 58.  Michael Schindler & Yael Waksman, Restriction of Liberty, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 351, 354–55.   
 59.  Rebecca Dresser, Autonomy and Its Limits in End-of-Life Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 399, 402 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2017) (“[I]t would be unre-
alistic and unwarranted to require judicial evaluations in every case.”). 
 60.  There is evidence that capacity assessments are not occurring, and incapacity is instead 
presumed when someone has dementia.  Miller et al., supra note 8.  This is deeply problematic 
because under current law, loss of decision-making authority should only occur when someone is 
found to not have capacity.  Even when capacity assessments occur, they tend to be informal.  Jen-
nifer Moye & Daniel C. Marson, Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity in Older Adults: An 
Emerging Area of Practice and Research, 62 J. GERONTOLOGY P3 (2007). 
 61.  Gary Sinoff & Natalia Blaja-Lisnic, Advance Decisions and Proxy Decision-Making in the 
Elderly: A Medical Perspective, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 97, 98; 
see also Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients’ Capacities to Consent to Treat-
ment, 319 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1635, 1635 (1988) (defining capacity as “communicating a 
choice, understanding relevant information, appreciating the current situation and its consequences, 
and manipulating information rationally”). 
  There are many critiques of capacity assessments.  For example, “[a] patient’s communica-
tion difficulties, fear, ambivalence, or hostility to medical professionals can lead evaluators to mis-
takenly label the patient incompetent.”  Dresser, supra note 59, at 402.  This may be especially true 
for persons with dementia who feel controlled by others and are upset and subsequently rebel.  Deir-
dre Fetherstonehaugh et al., Being Central to Decision Making Means I Am Still Here!: The Essence 
of Decision Making for People with Dementia, 27 J. AGING STUDIES 143, 146–47 (2013).  Addi-
tionally, capacity assessments may rely too heavily on verbal abilities and “miss the opportunity to 
provide cues and supports to maximize comprehension and minimize memory demands.”  Moye & 
Marson, supra note 60, at P7.  Furthermore, it is not at all clear that persons with typical decision-
making abilities and no disabilities would be found to have capacity if formally evaluated.  See also 
CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL 
DECISIONS (1998) (demonstrating the failure of informed consent).  Finally, there is only “limited 
agreement between evaluations by multiple clinicians, multiple measures, or between a clinician 
and a measure, especially for the standards of appreciation and reasoning.”  Moye & Marson, supra 
note 60, at P7; see also Diller, supra note 11, at 529–30 (discussing unreliability of capacity assess-
ments).  This may occur because capacity assessments are not free from value judgments.  A capac-
ity determination “necessarily reflects a balancing of two important, sometimes competing objec-
tives: to enhance the patient’s well-being and to respect the person as a self-determining individual.”  
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDICAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 57 (1982). 
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may also fluctuate over time.62  Someone may be able to consent to a medical 
intervention, but may have difficulty making financial decisions, for exam-
ple.63  Indeed, “[a] patient with early dementia may understand the benefits 
and risks associated with surgery and decide for [themselves] whether [they 
are] willing to undergo the procedure,”64 but may reside in an assisted living 
facility because they need assistance with many activities of daily living. 
While there are critiques of advance directives,65 many medical and le-
gal professionals advise their patients or clients with dementia to complete 
an advance directive soon after they are diagnosed, while they still have de-
cisional capacity.66  Creating an advance directive communicates the per-
son’s wishes regarding treatment, and the hope is that these wishes later will 
be followed.67  Legal scholars writing about dementia also often advocate for 
creating advance directives anticipating a possible future onset of dementia, 
with detailed instructions about how to ensure that death can be hastened 
should one acquire dementia.68  Most people do not engage in advance plan-
ning, however.69 
For individuals without advance directives, state law provides a default 
system of surrogates who can make decisions on behalf of an incapacitated 
                                                          
 62.  Bob Woods & Rebeka Pratt, Awareness in Dementia: Ethical and Legal Issues in Relation 
to People with Dementia, 9 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 423, 425 (2005); see also KENNY, supra 
note 36, at 80 (describing difficulty of determining capacity for patients with dementia); Bruce Jen-
nings, Alzheimer’s Disease: Quality of Life and the Goals of Care, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION 
TO BIOETHICS 437, 446 (John D. Arras et al. eds., 2015) (describing capacity as a matter of degree 
for persons with Alzheimer’s). 
 63.  Fetherstonehaugh et al., supra note 61, at 144. 
 64.  Coll, supra note 41, at 379. 
 65.  See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 4, at 256–61 (describing problems with advance directives); 
Blank, supra note 50, at 737; Dresser, Precommitment, supra note 3, at 1829–37 (describing prob-
lems with precommitment); Sinoff & Blaja-Lisnic, supra note 61, at 98, 100 (describing problems 
with precommitment); Wright, supra note 20, at 1133 n.387 (noting that these forms are derelation-
alized). 
 66.  NANCY L. MACE & PETER V. RABINS, THE 36-HOUR DAY: A FAMILY GUIDE TO CARING 
FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE ALZHEIMER DISEASE, RELATED DEMENTIAS, AND MEMORY LOSS 259 
(5th ed. 2011); PECK & LAW, supra note 12, at 57; Blank, supra note 50; Fox et al., supra note 11, 
at 69.  Decisional capacity to appoint a proxy or create an advance directive likely still exists in 
early dementia.  Coll, supra note 41, at 381–82.  
 67.  PECK & LAW, supra note 12, at 51, 55–56 (describing cases of “wrongful resuscitation”); 
Davis, supra note 4, at 745 (describing cases when advance directives were not followed); Sinoff 
& Blaja-Lisnic, supra note 61, at 100.  Some attorneys do not consider that people may want eve-
rything possible done to prolong their lives and instead provide specific guidance on how to cus-
tomize advance planning forms to ensure that death is hastened for persons with dementia.  PECK 
& LAW, supra note 12, at 73–74. 
 68.  See, e.g., Norman L. Cantor, On Avoiding Deep Dementia, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP., July–
Aug. 2018, at 15; Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 5; Menzel & Chandler-Cramer, supra note 39; 
Thaddeus Pope & Bernadette J. Richards, Decision-Making: At the End of Life and the Provision 
of Pretreatment Advice, 12 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 389 (2015). 
 69.  Schindler & Waksman, supra note 58, at 354; Kuldeep N. Yadav et al., Approximately One 
in Three US Adults Completes Any Type of Advance Directive for End-of-Life Care, 36 HEALTH 
AFF. 1244 (2017).  
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person as well as a default set of standards of surrogate decisionmaking.  In 
the absence of an advance directive, surrogates are eligible in a hierarchy that 
favors immediate family members, but may also include friends or other par-
ties after family.70  In order to respect the patient’s autonomy, surrogates are 
generally required to make a substituted judgment, or to decide as the inca-
pacitated person would decide if they were competent.71  Failing information 
about values and preferences that would guide a substituted judgment, a best 
interests standard is used.72 
2.  Guardianship and Dementia 
When a court finds a person is incompetent to make decisions, a guard-
ian may be appointed and given the power to make at least some (and perhaps 
all) decisions on their behalf.73  The justification for guardianship, a signifi-
cant liberty infringement, is that the state is obligated “to protect those who 
are incapable of dealing with their own affairs.”74  There may be a point in 
the progression of dementia that a person experiences “such a profound de-
cline in [their] cognition that [they are] deemed globally incapacitated.  In 
this event, the patient may warrant the appointment of a legal guardian.”75  
                                                          
 70.  Winsor C. Schmidt, Proxy Decision-Making: A Legal Perspective, in THE LAW AND 
ETHICS OF DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 311, 315 (describing problems when a physician is the 
surrogate decisionmaker and incorrectly assesses their patient’s quality of life). 
 71.  See, e.g., UHCDA, supra note 2, at prefatory note.  The problems with attempting to make 
a substituted judgment are well documented.  For example, there is often discordance between what 
the surrogate decides and what the patient wants.  Sinoff & Blaja-Lisnic, supra note 61, at 97, 99, 
100–01.  There also may be discordance between what the patient wanted while competent and what 
they want when incapacitated.  Ofra G. Golan, End-of-Life Care, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 393, 416. 
 72.  How best interests are determined is often unclear, however, and leaves room for value 
judgements from surrogates and physicians.  Sinoff & Blaja-Lisnic, supra note 61, at 101; see also 
JONATHAN HERRING, RELATIONAL AUTONOMY AND FAMILY LAW 45–46 (2014) (describing the 
indeterminacy of best interests tests in other contexts); Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Pa-
tients, supra note 3, at 395–97 (describing how others’ interests are sometimes incorporated into 
the best interests analysis).  The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act (“UHCDA”) directs the surro-
gates making a best interests determination to “consider the principal’s personal values to the extent 
known to the agent,” but “does not prescribe a detailed list of factors for determining the principal’s 
best interest but instead grants the agent [or surrogate] discretion to ascertain and weigh the factors 
likely to be of importance to the principal.” UHCDA, supra note 2, at § 2(e), 9. 
 73.  MARSHALL B. KAPP, THE LAW AND OLDER PERSONS: IS GERIATRIC JURISPRUDENCE 
THERAPEUTIC? 12–15 (2003) (describing guardianship); Diller, supra note 11, at 500–10 (describ-
ing guardianship and recent reforms); Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1116; Leslie Salzman, Rethink-
ing Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate 
of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157 (2010). 
 74.  Schindler & Waksman, supra note 58, at 353; KAPP, supra note 73, at 12–15; Diller, supra 
note 11, at 502; Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and Its Implications for the Rights of Elderly People Under International Law, 25 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 527, 560 (2009). 
 75.  Coll, supra note 41, at 382.  Books for caregivers of persons with dementia often discuss 
guardianship.  See, e.g., KENNY, supra note 36, at 82–83. 
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Many have expressed concerns about the use of plenary guardianships, 
which strip persons placed under guardianship of all decision-making author-
ity.76  One concern is that guardians may not receive training or be licensed,77 
which means guardians may not know how best to fulfill their responsibilities 
to their ward.78  Another concern is the negative psychological effects that 
can stem from being under guardianship, especially when guardians do not 
consider their ward’s current values and preferences,79 which guardians may 
not be required to do.80 
More importantly, however, guardians may be assigned with only min-
imal investigation of the extent of a ward’s decision-making abilities, and 
there are alternatives to plenary guardianship that could preserve decision-
making authority for persons with impaired cognition.  For example, guardi-
anship can be limited to specific decision-making domains (e.g., finances) 
instead of all decisions, or a healthcare proxy can be appointed.81  Relatedly, 
with conditions such as dementia, it is not clear at what point in the trajectory 
of the degenerative illness a guardian may be warranted, if ever, as the person 
likely retains at least some decision-making ability.82 
C.  Healthcare Decisionmaking and Dementia 
It is important to understand how persons with dementia prefer to make 
healthcare decisions and their healthcare decision-making experiences before 
                                                          
 76.  Kanter, supra note 74, at 560; Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1117–20 (summarizing cri-
tiques of guardianship). 
 77.  Schmidt, supra note 70, at 315. 
 78.  Id. at 318. 
 79.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1119–20. 
 80.  The Uniform Guardianship, Conservatorship, and Other Protective Proceedings Act directs 
guardians to include the person under guardianship in decisionmaking and to decide on the basis of 
wards’ preferences and goals. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, & OTHER PROTECTIVE 
PROCEEDINGS ACT, § 313(b)(2) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017) [here-
inafter UGCOPPA].  This is only a model law, however, and some courts have interpreted their 
state guardianship statutes that reference substituted judgment to refer only to the “preferences of 
the ward that were ‘previously expressed’—i.e., before the ward became incompetent.”  Estate of 
K.E.J. v. K.E.J., 887 N.E.2d 704, 721 (2008).  This means that the “[ward’s] current desire . . . even 
if it were clearly and consistently expressed over the course of the proceedings . . . [does] not auto-
matically trump all other considerations.” Id. 
 81.  Tailored guardianship was created to respect the decision-making abilities a person retains 
but is not often used.  Margaret Isabel Hall, Dementia, Autonomy and Guardianship for the Old, in 
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 339; Schindler & Waksman, supra note 58, 
at 353–54.  But see PECK & LAW, supra note 12, at 232 (“Most states tend to impose the least 
restrictive guardianship or conservatorship as is necessary to maintain the well-being of the inca-
pacitated person so as to preserve as many rights of the incapacitated person as possible.”); Jalayne 
J. Arias, A Time to Step In: Legal Mechanisms for Protecting Those with Declining Capacity, 39 
AM. J. L. & MED. 134, 156–57 (2013) (recommending limited financial guardianships). 
 82.  KENNY, supra note 36, at 80; Coll, supra note 41, at 383; Jennings, supra note 62, at 446; 
Schindler & Waksman, supra note 58, at 353. 
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assessing whether healthcare decision-making laws should change.  This Sec-
tion first summarizes the empirical literature on healthcare decision-making 
abilities and preferences, and then describes the experience of healthcare de-
cisionmaking for persons with dementia. 
1.  Healthcare Decision-making Abilities and Preferences of Persons 
with Dementia 
While dementia results in impaired cognition, persons with dementia 
may retain decision-making abilities for years after a dementia diagnosis.  In-
deed, a meta-analysis of studies of decisionmaking concludes that “a diagno-
sis of dementia does not imply incapacity.”83  Rather, research has shown 
that persons with dementia—even in the moderate to severe stages of demen-
tia—can “reliably report on their care values and preferences, well-being, and 
quality of life.”84  However, research on AD, the most common type of de-
mentia, has found that the capabilities of persons with dementia are not al-
ways recognized or accommodated, even by individuals closest to the person 
with dementia.85  Ignorance of their remaining abilities may not matter if per-
sons with dementia do not desire to retain autonomy, but this is often not the 
case. 
While there are no systematic studies of healthcare decision-making 
preferences of persons with MCI or dementia, there have been multiple 
smaller studies.86  These studies consistently reveal that, on the whole, per-
sons with MCI or mild dementia strongly prefer to be involved in decisions 
                                                          
 83.  Fetherstonehaugh et al., supra note 61, at 144. 
 84.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1142–43; see also James M. Wilkins, Dementia, Decision 
Making, and Quality of Life, 19 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 637, 637 (2017).  Some books targeted 
to family members and caregivers of persons with dementia also recognize that persons with de-
mentia can communicate about their preferences.  See, e.g., JOY A. GLENNER ET AL., WHEN YOUR 
LOVED ONE HAS DEMENTIA: A SIMPLE GUIDE FOR CAREGIVERS 18 (2005). 
 85.  See, e.g., Steven R. Sabat, Selfhood and Alzheimer’s Disease, in THE PERSON WITH 
ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE, supra note 10, at 88, 89.   
 86.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1144 (reviewing all the literature on dementia and decision- 
making). 
  Compared to the corpus of scientific and medical studies of dementia, there are relatively 
few studies that examine the preferences and experiences of persons with dementia.  Phinney, supra 
note 10, at 49; Young, supra note 10, at 29.  As one scholar remarked, “For a long time there seems 
to have been a largely implicit assumption that people with dementia were not able to express their 
own views in a way which made it appropriate to ask them.”  Hugh Series, The Happy Dementia 
Patient, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 105.  This assumption may be 
because medicalizing dementia “portrays dementia as a disease which steadily erodes the brain, 
leaving the physical shell of a person lacking the inner machinery of the person. . . . The shell be-
comes an object of care and study, but not a person to be consulted.”  Id. at 106.  Or this assumption 
could be due to a cultural or philosophical belief that personhood is related to cognitive ability.  
Once an individual is thought to lack decisional capacity, they become a “non-person,” and “there 
is no point in asking [a nonperson] about its experiences and beliefs.”  Id.; see also BEARD, supra 
note 18, at 109–10 (finding that when people received a diagnosis of MCI or dementia, clinicians 
began talking to their family instead of talking to them). 
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about their lives, rather than have others make decisions on their behalf.87  
Persons with early dementia know that their decision-making abilities will 
decline over time, but desire to remain independent and feel capable for as 
long as possible.88  They want to share in healthcare decisionmaking with 
their family members and physicians,89 but they also want others to respect-
fully provide support instead of taking over.90  Persons with dementia often 
convey frustration with not being acknowledged as having the capacity to 
think rationally, and with not having their preferences and decisions re-
spected.  As one man with AD told researchers: 
Sometimes, I’m about to say something that is very important to 
me and it’s nearly impossible to transmit the information because 
everyone listening has the presumption that what I’m about to say 
is unscrewed.  There’s essentially no way for me to convince any-
body that although I’m affected by Alzheimer’s in many ways, 
there’s still a lot that’s up there in my mind that has reason to be 
communicated!91 
Knowledge of decision-making preferences, coupled with the fact that 
dementia is not, at least initially and for some period of time in the progres-
sion of the disorder, completely incapacitating, has resulted in calls for clini-
cians to assist their patients with dementia in maintaining independence.92 
Additionally, clinicians are advised “to reduce the excess disability com-
monly encountered in dementia as a result of fear and stigma . . . [and] rec-
ognize that people with dementia, alongside their families, are active agents 
who seek to cope with and manage their illness.”93 
2.  Healthcare Decision-making Experiences 
As recent studies have demonstrated, when persons with dementia are 
not prevented from making or participating in their own healthcare decisions, 
they are able to maintain self-esteem and have enhanced wellbeing.94  As one 
research participant with dementia stated: 
                                                          
 87.  BEARD, supra note 18; Fetherstonehaugh et al., supra note 61; Wilkins, supra note 84, at 
637.  There is, of course, variability in decision-making preferences.  Some persons with dementia 
may be perfectly content with having others make decisions on their behalf.  
 88.  Fetherstonehaugh et al., supra note 61, at 147–48 (noting also that persons with dementia 
come up with ways to compensate for their acquired impairments).   
 89.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1145, 1150.  This is also consistent with other findings about 
late-life decision-making preferences.  Wright, supra note 20. 
 90.  Fetherstonehaugh et al., supra note 61, at 146–47. 
 91.  Lisa Snyder, Social and Family Relationships: Establishing and Maintaining Connections, 
in THE PERSON WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE, supra note 10, at 112, 115. 
 92.  Noa Bregnan & Orna Moore, Clinical Management of Dementia: An Overview (1), in THE 
LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 45.  Indeed, healthcare decision-making law also 
supports independent decisionmaking, absent a finding of incapacity. 
 93.  Fox et al., supra note 11, at 75.   
 94.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1151. 
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I feel more settled and okay in myself.  That I’m still doing things 
and capable.  To have still some independence in there.  That I am 
still here, and I do have a say, and I’m not just a person with de-
mentia and ignored, and that everybody else knows more than me.  
To still understand that there is a person there, and being aware of 
what stage I’m at, and what I can still input and allow that to hap-
pen.95 
Another research participant commented: 
I feel like I’m part of the decision, even though I know probably 
now I’m not contributing a great deal, at least I feel as if I’m part 
of the decision.  And that’s very, very important.  So I feel enabled 
and empowered, even though each year goes by I’m less partici-
pating, at least I feel as if I am.96 
Unfortunately, despite evidence that persons with dementia prefer to 
participate in decisionmaking (and despite emerging best clinical practices 
for interacting with patients with dementia meant to recognize and respect 
their agency), many patients with dementia report unhappiness and dissatis-
faction in their healthcare encounters.97  Patients report that once they are 
diagnosed with MCI or dementia, their healthcare providers no longer com-
municate with them, and may not even tell them their diagnosis.98  Instead, 
clinicians talk to their family members to convey and collect information 
about the patient’s experience with dementia.99  One patient with AD re-
ported, “My doctor asks me how I am, nods when I tell him, and then asks 
me to step outside.  He and my wife discuss me and then call me back and 
tell me what to do.”100  Another patient noted that, “People talk about me, 
around me, but don’t talk to me.”101  This exclusion from healthcare deci-
sionmaking, even for minor or routine decisions,102 is contrary to the deci-
                                                          
 95.  Fetherstonehaugh et al., supra note 61, at 148. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  BEARD, supra note 18; Phinney, supra note 10; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 
84.  This seems to be a common experience of persons with disability in healthcare settings.  Eliz-
abeth Pendo, What Patients with Disabilities Teach Us About the Everyday Ethics of Health Care, 
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287, 292–96 (2015). 
 98.  BEARD, supra note 18, at 12; Phinney, supra note 10, at 73 (“Several participants told me 
that their doctors did not listen to them . . . .”); Young, supra note 10, at 39. 
 99.  Young, supra note 10, at 39, 42.  For illustrative anecdotes about how some physicians do 
not recognize the personhood of their patients with dementia while some physicians still engage 
their patients with dementia in informed consent conversations, see POWELL, supra note 4, at 11–
12. 
 100.  Young, supra note 10, at 40. 
 101.  Fetherstonehaugh et al., supra note 61, at 148. 
 102.  Id. at 144 (“Despite strong indications within the literature that people with dementia are 
willing and able to participate in decision making, participation is often denied, sabotaged or token-
istic.”); Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1144–45; James M. Wilkins, Narrative Interest Standard: A 
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sion-making preferences of many persons with dementia, and leads to feel-
ings of marginalization and resentment towards family members and physi-
cians.103 
It is reasonable to assume that persons with dementia are excluded from 
participating in healthcare decisions because their dementia has progressed 
to the point that they are incapable of expressing what is important to them 
or making a choice (i.e., they fail at least one part of a formal capacity as-
sessment).  There is empirical evidence, however, that patients are excluded 
from healthcare decisionmaking even when they have decisional capacity.104  
One scholar observed, “[I]n some cases it appeared that doctors were inclined 
to conclude that a person lacked capacity simply because [they] had demen-
tia.”105  Others have noted, “It is . . . customary in healthcare settings to rely 
upon family members to make treatment and long-term care decisions for 
persons with dementia, regardless of whether legal or medical channels have 
formally established incapacity to make decisions.”106 
Studies reveal several reasons why persons with dementia are prevented 
from making or participating in decisions that affect their lives.  First, persons 
with dementia may be viewed as incapable of making good decisions.107  
That is, those with an interest in the wellbeing of the person with dementia, 
such as family members and physicians, may fear that because dementia ad-
                                                          
Novel Approach to Surrogate Decision-Making for People with Dementia, 58 GERONTOLOGIST 
1016, 1017 (2018). 
  There is variation in decision-making experiences, however.  Studies show that the degree 
to which the person with dementia participates in decisionmaking depends on the stage of dementia, 
level of impairment, educational background, gender, and relationship type with their surrogates.  
Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1146–48.   
 103.  Fetherstonehaugh et al., supra note 61, at 148; Young, supra note 10, at 40–41.  
 104.  Indeed, studies have shown that clinicians sometimes attempt to remove decision-making 
authority from their patients and instead choose what they think is in their patient’s best interests.  
This occurs not after a formal finding of incapacity, but rather “on the basis of history, diagnosis, 
disability, age, appearance, behaviour or the fact that someone was making an unwise decision.”  
Hugh Series, Best Interests Determination: A Medical Perspective, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 85, 91. 
 105.  Id. at 92.  That is, “inability to manage one’s own independence and care was confused 
with inability to make a decision.”  Id.  Studies have also revealed that physicians do not know how 
to assess capacity and determine whether a surrogate decisionmaker needs to be consulted for their 
patient.  Schmidt, supra note 70, at 315.  
 106.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1142.  It is important to emphasize that this custom is contrary 
to healthcare decision-making law, which requires a determination of incapacity before others are 
legally authorized to make decisions for an individual without their consent.  See UHCDA, supra 
note 2, at 5(a). 
 107.  Woods & Pratt, supra note 62, at 424.  Some research has shown that healthcare providers 
may assume their older patients are incapable of making decisions.  Cheryl Dellasega et al., Com-
mentary: Decision-Making Capacity in the Acutely Ill Elderly, in OLDER ADULTS’ DECISION-
MAKING AND THE LAW 142, 152 (Michael Smyer et al. eds., 1996). 
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versely affects cognition, the person will, without full understanding or in-
tention, make decisions counter to their own wellbeing.108  In order to combat 
this possibility, others take over the decisionmaking for the person with de-
mentia, even if the person with dementia still has capacity.109 
Second, family members may not realize how important remaining in-
dependent in healthcare decisionmaking is to the person with dementia.110  
Or, the family members may understand, but discount the values and prefer-
ences of the person with dementia because they desire to control deci-
sionmaking,111 perhaps because the decisions impact themselves or other 
family members. 
Third, family members may know that the person with dementia is ca-
pable of and wants to be involved in decisionmaking, and may even support 
their loved one in retaining decision-making authority, but are nonetheless 
pressured by healthcare providers to take over decisionmaking.112  Relatedly, 
healthcare providers may be under the mistaken impression that a dementia 
diagnosis requires that surrogates make decisions rather than the patient.113 
In sum, the experience of healthcare decisionmaking often does not ac-
cord with the capabilities and preferences of persons with mild to moderate 
dementia, which leads to a decrease in their wellbeing.  Indeed, the majority 
of persons with dementia are “in the earlier years . . . [and] are perfectly able 
both to experience joy and to suffer when they are no longer treated as full 
persons.”114 
                                                          
 108.  Indeed, a central tension surrounding debates about dementia and decisionmaking is how 
to balance safety and freedom.  POWELL, supra note 4, at 161, 167, 204, 213, 235, and 237.  Recent 
research in nursing homes has demonstrated that nurses value safety more than honoring patient 
preferences because they worry about lawsuits or administrative sanctions.  Liza L. Behrens, Nurs-
ing Staff Perceptions of Risk When Honoring Nursing Home Residents’ Preferences: A Sequential 
Focus Group Study (June 11, 2019) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Penn State University) (on file 
with author). 
 109.  Woods & Pratt, supra note 62, at 424 (“[I]t is the perception of others that the person with 
dementia lacks insight that leads to a lack of respect, or at least a willingness to overrule, the per-
son’s autonomy . . . .”).  Family members may also take over decisionmaking if they consume books 
targeted toward caregivers that advise them to do so.  See, e.g., GLENNER ET AL., supra note 84, at 
24–25; KENNY, supra note 36, at 57–76 (describing the person with dementia as “mute”).  
 110.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1146. 
 111.  Id. at 1146, 1150. 
 112.  Id. at 1148.   
 113.  Id. at 1150 (“Case managers also felt it was their legal duty to focus on the decision of the 
individual who was named as a surrogate decision-maker and even exclude the person with demen-
tia from the conversation . . . .”). 
 114.  Powell, supra note 57, at S72. 
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II.  LAWS SHOULD NOT PREVENT PERSONS WITH DEMENTIA FROM 
PARTICIPATING IN HEALTHCARE DECISIONS 
As Part I explains, persons with dementia prefer to make or at least par-
ticipate in decisions about their healthcare but are routinely marginalized in 
or excluded from healthcare decisionmaking, both by family members and 
healthcare providers.  Such marginalization and exclusion disregard their au-
tonomy interests, impede their self-determination, and decrease their wellbe-
ing.  If respect for autonomy and increased wellbeing are valued social goods, 
then persons with dementia should not be prevented from participation in 
healthcare decisionmaking.  Because the law of surrogate healthcare deci-
sionmaking facilitates this marginalization and exclusion, this Part describes 
why the law should change. 
A.  Preventing Persons with Dementia from Participating in 
Healthcare Decisionmaking Is Inconsistent with Respect for 
Autonomy 
The law and ethics of healthcare decisionmaking are based on respect 
for autonomy.115  This is not only because of the traditional centrality of au-
tonomy in all areas of law,116 but also because autonomy is especially im-
portant in healthcare decisionmaking.117  It is in this context that decisions 
are made about what happens to one’s body, and some of these decisions 
concern the continuation of life.  Because only one person bears the corporeal 
consequence of the healthcare decision, it is fairly uncontroversial to argue 
that this person should be the one to decide.118 
When an individual has impaired cognition, which could affect their 
ability to be autonomous, efforts are made to respect the individual’s prece-
dent autonomy, if any, by relying on advance directives or other evidence of 
past preferences and values.119  This decision-making process is required by 
law.120  Because dementia results in cognitive impairment, and is commonly 
viewed as incompatible with autonomous decisionmaking,121 healthcare pro-
viders and family members may exclude persons with dementia from 
                                                          
 115.  See Wright, supra note 20, at 1064.  
 116.  Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 
1705, 1706–08 (1992). 
 117.  See Wright, supra note 20.  Recent scholarship has noted that enhancing patient agency 
and autonomy is good for their health.  MARK D. SULLIVAN, THE PATIENT AS AGENT OF HEALTH 
AND HEALTH CARE (2017). 
 118.  Dresser, supra note 59, at 400 (“It was the patients who would be most affected by the 
treatment decision; thus, they should be permitted to choose for themselves.”); WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., supra note 27, at 45. 
 119.  See UHCDA, supra note 2. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  But see Jaworska, supra note 4, at 109 (“[M]any of these patients may still be capable of 
autonomy to a significant degree . . . .”).  
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healthcare decisionmaking or override their current wishes, and yet under-
stand their actions as surrogates as respectful of the (prior) autonomy of the 
person with dementia.122 
But the symptoms of MCI or early dementia may not result in cognitive 
impairments significant enough to eradicate present autonomy, or trigger use 
of a surrogate under healthcare decision-making law.123  Many persons with 
dementia should then retain their legal right to make their own healthcare 
decisions.  But, as discussed earlier, there is evidence that physicians exclude 
patients with dementia from the decision-making process even when their 
patients have decisional capacity.124  Importantly, studies also show that ca-
pacity may not even be assessed, but instead incapacity may be presumed 
solely due to the diagnosis of dementia.125  The law of surrogate deci-
sionmaking facilitates this exclusion because it defers to physician’s judg-
ment on whether their patient has decisional capacity.  Change is thus re-
quired so that persons who retain decision-making capabilities are ensured of 
their legal right to make their own healthcare decisions. 
Given the centrality of the principle of respect for autonomy to 
healthcare decision-making law and clinical practice, it is also necessary to 
critically examine whether the conceptualization of autonomy in law, medi-
cine, and bioethics works in practice.  This Article argues that the traditional 
understanding of autonomy is both inaccurate and incomplete, and when ap-
plied to persons with dementia, disrespects their present (i.e., contemporane-
ous) autonomy. 
Indeed, empirical research demonstrates that traditional notions of au-
tonomous decisionmaking126 are inaccurate.  Behavioral economics research 
reveals that decisionmaking is distorted by cognitive biases,127 and that peo-
ple are therefore capable only of “bounded rationality.”128  Psychological re-
search also demonstrates that many decisions are not made rationally but, 
                                                          
 122.  See supra Section I.C. 
 123.  For example, persons with dementia may forget people’s names or be unable to adequately 
manage their finances but be found to possess healthcare decision-making capacity.  See generally 
supra Sections I.A, I.B.1.  But see Jaworska, supra note 4, at 109 (arguing that the emphasis on 
decision-making capacity to determine whether someone is autonomous is misguided, and the rel-
evant question about whether a person with dementia is autonomous is whether they have the ca-
pacity to value).  
 124.  See Series, supra note 86, at 105. 
 125.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1142; Series, supra note 86, at 105.  Presumptions of inca-
pacity at any stage of dementia will translate into an unnecessary loss of autonomy.  Woods & Pratt, 
supra note 62, at 426. 
 126.  See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 23, at 104–05. 
 127.  See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); RICHARD H. THALER 
& CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 
23–37 (2009). 
 128.  Russell Korobkin, Three Choice Architecture Paradigms for Healthcare Policy, in 
NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 15 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 
2016). 
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rather, are made on the basis of emotions.129  Furthermore, philosophers and 
social scientists have demonstrated that many people cannot make decisions 
that promote their interests because not all desirable options are available due 
to structural conditions such as poverty.  That is, even if perfect rationality is 
possible, people still may not be fully self-determining or autonomous given 
limited options.130  In the healthcare setting, autonomous decisionmaking is 
even more difficult because patients are in a vulnerable physical or mental 
state; there is a higher cognitive burden to understand complex medical in-
formation; and there is a relationship of power and dependence between 
healthcare providers and their patients.131  Thus, it is more accurate to de-
scribe decisionmaking by persons without cognitive impairments as agentic 
rather than autonomous.132 
The dominant understanding of autonomy as individualistic also does 
not accord with lived experience.  Feminist philosophers, disability studies 
scholars, and social scientists have advanced the concept of relational auton-
omy,133 which recognizes that autonomy occurs (or is thwarted) in interac-
tions with others.  Recent legal scholarship has also demonstrated that indi-
viduals making healthcare decisions at the end of life understand autonomous 
decisionmaking as relational in nature.134  Specifically, people often prefer to 
consult and collaborate in healthcare decisions with others, such as family 
members and physicians, and may also make decisions on the basis of other’s 
interests.135  As I have argued elsewhere,136 the concept of autonomy in 
                                                          
 129.  See Jonathan Herring, Best Interests and Dementia, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 301, 304. 
 130.  Sherwin, supra note 24, at 13–14. 
 131.  See generally NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra 
note 128.  Indeed, using informed consent as the standard of autonomous decisionmaking demon-
strates how often healthcare decisions are not autonomous.  SCHNEIDER, supra note 61, at xi–xii.  
Sometimes patients do not even perceive that they have made a choice.  Theresa S. Drought & 
Barbara A. Koenig, “Choice” in End-of-Life Decision Making: Researching Fact or Fiction?, 42 
GERONTOLOGIST 114, 121 (2002). 
 132.  Agency for the purposes of this Article means “an individual is free to exercise . . . choice, 
even if the choice is from a limited set of options” or is made without full understanding.  See Dara 
E. Purvis, The Rules of Maternity, 84 TENN. L. REV. 367, 375 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(describing autonomy and defining agency); see also STEVEN R. SABAT, ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE & 
DEMENTIA: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 181 (2017) (“Agency refers to a person’s feelings 
of control . . . and it involves the benefits of making choices . . . .”).  This definition of agency aligns 
with the definition of autonomy found in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 3(a), Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 
U.N.T.S. 44910 (noting autonomy “includ[es] the freedom to make one’s own choices.”).   
 133.  JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, 
AND LAW 19–89 (2011); Harold Braswell, Can There Be a Disability Studies Theory of “End-of-
Life Autonomy?” 31 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 4 (2011), http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1704/1754; Car-
olyn Ells, Lessons About Autonomy from the Experience of Disability, 27 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 
599, 600 (2001); Purvis, supra note 132, at 374–77; Sherwin, supra note 24. 
 134.  Wright, supra note 20, at 1066–67, 1093, 1137. 
 135.  Id. at 1081–94. 
 136.  Id. at 1066–68. 
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healthcare decision-making law requires revision to reflect its relational na-
ture. 
If the decision-making abilities of persons with dementia are assessed 
with respect to the ideal, atomistic conceptualization of autonomy, this al-
most ensures that persons with dementia will be deemed incapable of auton-
omy, and a surrogate will be used for healthcare decisions.  But if the deci-
sion-making abilities of persons with dementia are compared to those of 
persons with typical cognitive abilities, it is not at all clear that persons with 
dementia should be prevented from making their own decisions.  Again, de-
mentia is not globally incapacitating in its earlier stages, and people retain 
significant capabilities despite the onset of cognitive impairments.137  Re-
search also has demonstrated that persons with MCI or early dementia have 
the ability to decide agentically, on the basis of their interests, to the same 
extent as persons without dementia. 
Thus, in the healthcare setting, where assistance with decisionmaking is 
preferred by both patients with and without dementia,138 and where both 
kinds of patients will struggle to fully understand the decisions they make,139 
it is both logical and ethical to use the same decision-making standard for all 
patients.  Applying the principle of equality could mean that no one is per-
mitted to make their own healthcare decisions, returning to a time of physi-
cian paternalism.  This Article argues instead that all patients should be per-
mitted to make their own healthcare decisions. 
To conclude, if autonomous decisionmaking is reconceptualized as 
agentic and relational decisionmaking, it becomes clear that many persons 
with MCI and mild to moderate dementia retain autonomy and should, there-
fore, not be prevented from making their own healthcare decisions at the time 
they need to be made.140  How autonomy in law is understood and applied 
thus should change, so that persons with dementia can participate in 
                                                          
 137.  Bruce Jennings, Agency and Moral Relationship in Dementia, 40 METAPHILOSOPHY 425, 
430 (2009) (“Semantic agency refers to the capacity to communicate . . . with others, and to evince 
understanding and evaluation of such communication . . . this capacity persists in properly struc-
tured, supportive caregiving environments even when high-level cognitive, speech, executive, and 
short-term memory functioning have been impaired.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 138.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1145, 1150; Wright, supra note 20.   
 139.  SCHNEIDER, supra note 61, at 144; Jennifer Moye et al., Capacity to Consent to Treatment: 
Empirical Comparison of Three Instruments in Older Adults with and Without Dementia, 44 
GERONTOLOGIST 166, 172 (2004) (finding that persons with mild dementia, although impaired, 
have the capacity to make healthcare decisions). 
 140.  Other scholars distinguish between agency (i.e., participation in decisionmaking) and au-
tonomy in the context of dementia and decisionmaking.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1145–46.  The 
problem with this distinction is that it assumes that autonomy is possible at all. 
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healthcare decisionmaking to the extent that they desire and are able.141  Re-
taining autonomy will likely also result in increased wellbeing for persons 
with dementia.142 
B.  In Order to Increase Wellbeing, Laws Should Match the 
Preferences of Persons with Dementia 
Prominent health law scholars, bioethicists, and healthcare organiza-
tions have argued that laws affecting patients should account for patients’ 
preferences and interests.143  Such consideration may make it more likely that 
laws enhance, or at least do not diminish, the wellbeing of persons subject to 
them.144  Healthcare decision-making laws, and proposals to change these 
laws, therefore should take into account the perspectives and interests of per-
sons with dementia.145 
Presently, however, much of the recent scholarly discussion about laws 
that impact persons with dementia is dominated by nondisabled persons who 
fear and abhor the prospect that they will acquire dementia in the future.146  
Indeed, scholarship and legal advice about dementia tends to focus on how 
                                                          
 141.  Respect for the agency of persons with dementia would also mean respecting the decision 
of some persons to defer to others. 
  Additionally, when it comes to decisions about, for example, where to live or whether to 
drive, there may be greater negative effect on others than with respect to healthcare decisionmaking 
(the effects of which are internalized to a greater degree).  In the former instances, other’s interests 
need to be considered, and the decision of the person with dementia may be challenged.  See 
POWELL, supra note 4, at 243 (describing risks of harm to self and others when persons with de-
mentia drive); Woods & Pratt, supra note 62, at 428 (“Where the risks are perceived as being to 
others, not just to the person with dementia, then autonomy is most likely to be overruled . . . .”). 
 142.  Fetherstonehaugh et al., supra note 61, at 143. 
 143.  Alicia Hall, Making Good Choices: Toward a Theory of Well-being in Medicine, 37 
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS. 383, 394 (2016) (“[A]ny well-being policy can be justified only 
if it is based on the values of those people whose well-being the policy intends to foster.”); Mark A. 
Hall et al., Rethinking Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 342 (2006) (arguing that “the 
central purpose of healthcare law is to improve the lives of patients”); Lois Shepherd & Mark A. 
Hall, Patient-Centered Health Law and Ethics, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1429, 1433 (2010) 
(“[L]aw that affects patients should better take into account what it means to be a patient.”).   
 144.  The legal perspective that considers law’s effects on psychological wellbeing is known as 
therapeutic jurisprudence.  See, e.g., David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 979 (1991). 
 145.  Rebecca Dresser, Advance Directives and Discrimination Against People with Dementia, 
48 HASTINGS CTR. REP., July–Aug. 2018, at 26 (“[P]eople with the condition should be represented 
in the debate over treatment standards.”); WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 4, 37 (“People 
with dementia . . . often have unique insights to their condition and life.  They should be involved 
in formulating the policies, plans, laws and services that relate to them.”).  Further, experts on elder 
law have also emphasized the need for law that applies to older persons to enhance their wellbeing.  
KAPP, supra note 73. 
 146.  See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 68; Menzel & Chandler-Cramer, supra note 39. 
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to avoid living with it.147  For example, some scholars argue that physician 
aid in dying laws should be changed to permit persons with advanced demen-
tia to access this end-of-life option.148  Additionally, scholars also publish 
articles advising how to tailor advance directives to direct others not to pro-
vide assistance with eating or drinking in the event of dementia, which if 
followed will hasten death.149 
Privileging the arguments of persons without dementia, who have 
largely negative views of the disability, may make formulating law and pol-
icy that can promote what is actually good for persons with dementia diffi-
cult.150  To better promote the wellbeing of persons with dementia, the per-
spectives, experiences, and interests of those with dementia should instead 
be prioritized.151 
Studies have demonstrated that when persons with dementia are pre-
vented from making decisions, they are unhappy because they want to be 
involved in decisionmaking, and that conversely, being involved in deci-
sionmaking and feeling agentic enhances their psychological wellbeing.152  
Because healthcare decision-making law is used to deny persons with demen-
tia the opportunity to make healthcare decisions at the time the decision needs 
to be made—contrary to the preferences of many persons with dementia and 
                                                          
 147.  See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 68; Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 5; Menzel & Chandler-
Cramer, supra note 39; Pope & Richards, supra note 68.  
 148.  Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 5.  Persons who elect physician aid in dying in the United 
States are required to have decisional capacity at the time the request is made.  Using an advance 
directive for physician aid in dying is impermissible.  Id. at 484. 
 149.  See, e.g., Menzel & Chandler-Cramer, supra note 39.  There are notable exceptions, how-
ever.  See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 145.  
  Advocacy organizations have also created and distributed such advance directives.  See, 
e.g., JoNel Aleccia, “Aggressive” New Advance Directive Would Let Dementia Patients Refuse 
Food, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 30, 2018), https://khn.org/news/aggressive-new-advance-di-
rective-would-let-dementia-patients-refuse-food/. 
 150.  Daniel Callahan, Terminating Life-Sustaining Treatment of the Demented, 25 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP., Nov.–Dec. 1995, at 25 (“The harder it is for us to imagine life as tolerable in such cir-
cumstances, the harder it will be to determine what is beneficial for the patient.”).  What people fear 
when they think about a future with dementia is the severe, final stages.  As some scholars have 
recently highlighted, however, there is a great deal of life to enjoy in the mild to moderate stages of 
dementia.  POWELL, supra note 4, at 213. 
 151.  As others have noted, “bioethicists have for too long had the power to set the terms of 
discussions about practices that primarily affect people with disabilities.”  Mary Crossley, Ending-
Life Decisions: Some Disability Perspectives, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 920 (2017).  This is also 
consistent with the political demand from the disability rights community: “Nothing About Us 
Without Us!”  Id. 
 152.  See, e.g., Phinney, supra note 10; Young, supra note 10; see also SABAT, supra note 132, 
at 181 (2018) (describing link between agency and wellbeing); Melanie H. Mallers et al., Perceived 
Control in the Lives of Older Adults: The Influence of Langer and Rodin’s Work on Gerontological 
Theory, Policy, and Practice, 54 GERONTOLOGIST 67, 68–69 (2014) (describing positive associa-
tion of control and increased wellbeing for older adults).  Philosophers also note the link between 
autonomy and wellbeing.  See, e.g., Jaworska, supra note 4, at 109 (“I associate potential for auton-
omy primarily with the capacity to value, and well-being with living in accordance with one’s val-
ues.”). 
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to the detriment of their wellbeing—it is necessary to think about ways to 
improve the legal regime governing healthcare decisionmaking for this pop-
ulation. 
III.  SUPPORTED DECISIONMAKING AND DEMENTIA 
Laws governing healthcare decisionmaking should ensure that persons, 
including those with dementia, who want to make their own healthcare deci-
sions are able to do so.  Law should also accommodate decision-making pref-
erences for consultation or collaboration with others.  With respect to these 
ends, healthcare decision-making law as often applied fails. 
While healthcare decision-making law seems to be the most appropriate 
source for guidance about how healthcare decisions should be made for pa-
tients with decisional impairments, turning instead to other bodies of law ac-
tually may better respect the autonomy and promote the wellbeing of persons 
with dementia.  An alternative model of decisionmaking that does not rely on 
surrogate decisionmakers for persons with impaired cognition, known as sup-
ported decisionmaking, can be found in state disability and guardianship law 
and can be beneficially applied to persons with dementia.153 
This Article argues for widespread adoption of supported decision-mak-
ing legislation, and also that persons with dementia should enter into these 
agreements with trusted supporters in order to assert their autonomy and 
make their own healthcare decisions.  This Part begins by describing the con-
cept of supported decisionmaking, and why this model is attractive to persons 
with disabilities and their advocates.  It then describes existing supported de-
cision-making laws in the United States.  This Part concludes by discussing 
the application of supported decisionmaking to persons with dementia. 
A.  Argument for Supported Decisionmaking 
Many disability advocates argue that to respect the civil and human 
rights of persons with cognitive impairments, such persons must remain free 
to make their own decisions instead of having this authority transferred to 
another person.154  Both the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)155 and 
Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(“CRPD”)156 support this argument.157  For jurisdictions wishing to comply 
                                                          
 153.  See infra Section III.B. 
 154.  ANNA ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, RESTORING VOICE TO PEOPLE WITH COGNITIVE 
DISABILITIES: REALIZING THE RIGHT TO EQUAL RECOGNITION BEFORE THE LAW (2017); 
GOODING, supra note 16; Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1127. 
 155.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
 156.  United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 132, at 
art. 12.   
 157.  Id.; Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1118–19; Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians 
and Protectors of the Mind”: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and 
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with the principles embodied in disability law—particularly with the procla-
mation in the CRPD that “persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an 
equal basis with others in all aspects of life”158—supported decisionmaking 
is an attractive alternative to surrogate decisionmaking.159 
Although there is no consensus on the definition of supported deci-
sionmaking, generally it means that “an individual with cognitive challenges 
is the ultimate decision-maker but is provided support from one or more per-
sons who explain issues to the individual and, where necessary, interpret the 
individual’s words and behavior to determine his or her preferences.”160  Un-
der this model, persons with disabilities retain legal authority to make their 
own decisions.  Absent these laws and use of these agreements, persons with 
cognitive impairments may not be entitled under law to make their own de-
cisions.  Disability advocates argue that supported decisionmaking may lead 
to feelings of empowerment and better emotional, psychological, and physi-
cal wellbeing,161 and thus this decision-making model should replace both 
guardianship and surrogate decisionmaking for persons with decisional im-
pairments. 
The supported decision-making relationship may be documented in a 
written agreement, which formalizes what most people do informally—con-
sult with others in making decisions.  As others have noted, this model of 
decisionmaking consists of “a series of relationships, practices, arrange-
ments, and agreements, of more or less formality and intensity, designed to 
assist an individual with a disability to make and communicate to others de-
cisions about the individual’s life.”162  Thus, supported decisionmaking ac-
cords with the concept of relational autonomy.163 
Supported decisionmaking for many persons with dementia is prefera-
ble to surrogate decisionmaking.  Persons with dementia who enter these 
agreements retain legal capacity, regardless of their cognitive impairments.  
That is, they are decisionmakers whose choices must be respected by third 
parties.  They therefore retain agency in healthcare decisionmaking, which is 
                                                          
the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159 (2013); Salzman, supra note 73, at 
197–220. 
 158.  United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 132, at 
art. 12, ¶ 2. 
 159.  Schindler & Waksman, supra note 58, at 355.  Other scholars have argued, however, that 
“no amount of support will render every individual capable of making his or her ‘own’ decisions,” 
and so the system of surrogate decisionmaking remains important to protect vulnerable people.  
Hall, supra note 81, at 347–48 (arguing against supported decisionmaking for persons with demen-
tia). 
 160.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1120.   
 161.  Id. at 1127.   
 162.  Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from Guardianship to Supported 
Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2012, at 8, 10. 
 163.  See supra Section II.A. 
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consistent with their stated preferences to make or participate in decisions.  
As prior research has demonstrated, involvement in decisionmaking leads to 
increased wellbeing for persons with dementia.164  Thus, supported deci-
sionmaking has the potential to enhance both the relational autonomy and 
wellbeing of persons with mild to moderate dementia. 
B.  Supported Decision-making Laws in the United States 
A few jurisdictions in the United States have adopted supported deci-
sion-making legislation.  Texas, in 2015, was the first state to do so.165  Del-
aware, Wisconsin, the District of Columbia, Indiana, and Alaska have since 
passed supported decision-making legislation, and other states are currently 
considering adoption.166  This Section describes the common elements of 
supported decision-making law in the United States. 
1.  Terminology 
The terminology used to describe parties who enter into a supported de-
cision-making agreement differs in each state’s laws.  While all use the word 
“supporter,” the person with a disability is referred to as “adult with a disa-
bility” in Texas,167 “principal” in Delaware and Alaska,168 “adult with a func-
tional impairment” in Wisconsin,169 “supported person”/“adult with a disa-
bility” in the District of Columbia,170 and “adult” in Indiana.171  This Article 
refers to the person with a disability who enters into this agreement as the 
“principal,” and those who agree to provide support as “supporters.” 
2.  Purpose 
The supported decision-making laws in Texas and Delaware start with 
a statement of the law’s purpose.172  In Texas, the purpose of the Act is “to 
recognize a less restrictive alternative to guardianship for adults with disabil-
ities who need assistance with decisions regarding daily living but who are 
                                                          
 164.  See supra Section II.B. 
 165.  Eliana J. Theodorou, Supported Decision-Making in the Lone-Star State, 93 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 973 (2018) (describing how fiscal conservatives and disability rights advocates supported this 
guardianship reform for different reasons). 
 166.  Additionally, some states have built supported decisionmaking into very specific laws and 
regulations, such as those relating to organ transplantation decisions, for example, KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 65-326 (2016); MD. CODE. ANN. HEALTH GEN. § 20-1605 (LexisNexis 2015); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2108.08(A) ( LexisNexis 2017), or participation in managed or long-term care, for example, 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-1422; WASH. REV. CODE § 70.129.140.  
 167.  See, e.g., TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.051 (West 2018). 
 168.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9403A(8) (2018); ALASKA STAT.  § 13.56.020 (2018). 
 169.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 52.03 (West 2018). 
 170.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 7-2131(13) (2019). 
 171.  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-14-1 (West 2019). 
 172.  Wisconsin, the District of Columbia, Indiana, and Alaska do not specify the purpose. 
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not considered incapacitated persons for purposes of establishing a guardian-
ship under this title.”173  Delaware has a much lengthier statement of purpose 
that describes supported decisionmaking in detail.174  Delaware also directs 
that supported decisionmaking 
be administered and interpreted in accordance with all of the fol-
lowing principles: 
 (1) All adults should be able to live in the manner they wish and 
to accept or refuse support, assistance, or protection as long as they 
do not harm others and are capable of making decisions about those 
matters. 
 (2) All adults should be able to be informed about and, to the best 
of their ability, participate in the management of their affairs. 
 (3) All adults should receive the most effective yet least restric-
tive and intrusive form of support, assistance, or protection when 
they are unable to care for themselves or manage their affairs alone. 
 (4) The values, beliefs, wishes, cultural norms, and traditions that 
an adult holds should be respected in managing an adult’s af-
fairs.175 
3.  Presumption of Capability 
Supported decision-making legislation in Delaware and Wisconsin di-
rects that capacity is to be presumed for adults.176  These state statutes and 
the Indiana and Alaska statutes also note that entering into a supported deci-
sion-making agreement is not evidence of incapacity to act outside of the 
agreement.177  Indiana and Alaska direct that the principal who has a sup-
ported decision-making agreement is not required to use supporters and can 
act independently.178 
4.  Eligibility Requirements for Supporters 
States may prohibit some people from acting as supporters.  In Delaware 
and Alaska, employers or employees of the principal cannot be supporters, 
                                                          
 173.  TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.003 (West 2018) (footnote omitted). 
 174.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9402A(a)(1)–(3) (2018). 
 175.  Id. § 9402A(b)(1)–(4). 
 176.  Id. § 9404A(a); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 52.03 (West 2018).  This is consistent with the 
UHCDA, which states: “An individual is presumed to have capacity to make a health-care decision, 
to give or revoke an advance health-care directive, and to designate or disqualify a surrogate.” 
UHCDA, supra note 2, at 32.  Texas, D.C., and Indiana do not have such provisions.  Alaska states 
that “a principal is considered to have capacity even if the capacity is achieved by the principal 
receiving decision-making assistance.”  ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.150(d) (2018). 
 177.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9404A(c); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 52.03; IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-
14-4(c) (West 2019); ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.150(c). 
 178.  IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-14-4(c); ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.150(b). 
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and neither can those who provide “paid support services,” unless these clas-
ses of persons are immediate family members of the principal.179  Further, a 
supporter cannot be “[a]n individual against whom the principal has obtained 
an order of protection from abuse or an individual who is the subject of a civil 
or criminal order prohibiting contact with the principal.”180 
The District of Columbia also specifies in detail who is not permitted to 
be a supporter, and does not permit people who provide support services,181 
own or operate an organization that provides services,182 or works for state 
agencies that are “financially responsible for the supported person’s care” to 
be supporters, unless they are relatives.183  Further, persons who have harmed 
or exploited the principal or a child, older person, or person with a disabil-
ity,184 or who have committed other types of crimes, such as fraud and theft, 
are not permitted to be supporters.185 
Texas, Wisconsin, and Indiana do not specify classes of individuals in-
eligible to be supporters, but circumstances are specified, that if occurring, 
terminate the agreement.186 
5.  Supporter’s Role and Authority 
Texas expressly designates supporters as fiduciaries,187 and limits the 
supporter only to “exercise the authority granted . . . in the supported deci-
sion-making agreement.”188  While the other states do not expressly classify 
supporters as fiduciaries, Indiana describes the relationship between princi-
pals and supporters as “one of trust and confidence,”189 and Alaska directs 
supporters to “act with the care, competence, and diligence ordinarily exer-
cised by individuals in similar circumstances.”190  And in the District of Co-
lumbia, legislation confines supporters’ authority to that specified in the 
agreement.191 
Delaware also specifically prohibits supporters from: 
                                                          
 179.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9406A(b)(1)–(2); ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.020(1)–(2). 
 180.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9406A(b)(3).  Alaska’s statute is similarly worded.  ALASKA 
STAT. § 13.56.020(3). 
 181.  D.C. CODE § 7-2132(a)(1) (2019). 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. § 7-2132(a)(2). 
 184.  Id. § 7-2132(b)(1)(A)–(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 185.  Id. § 7-2132(b)(1)(B). 
 186.  See infra Section III.B.8.  
 187.  TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.052(b)–(c) (West 2018). 
 188.  Id. § 1357.052(a).  Wisconsin and D.C. use very similar language.  Compare, WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 52.12 (West 2018); with D.C. CODE § 7-2133(b). 
 189.  IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-14-5(b) (West 2019). 
 190.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.090 (2018). 
 191.  D.C. CODE § 7-2133(a)(1)–(3). 
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 (1) Exerting undue influence upon, or making decisions on be-
half of, the principal. 
 (2) Obtaining, without the consent of the principal, information 
that is not reasonably related to matters with which the supporter 
is authorized to assist under the supported decision-making agree-
ment. 
 (3) Using, without the consent of the principal, information ac-
quired for a purpose other than assisting the principal to make a 
decision under the supported decision-making agreement.192 
6.  Scope of Agreement 
Legislation also specifies the scope of the supported decision-making 
agreement.193  Texas permits a principal to voluntarily authorize 
the supporter to do any or all of the following: 
 (1) provide supported decision-making, including assistance in 
understanding the options, responsibilities, and consequences of 
the adult’s life decisions, without making those decisions on behalf 
of the adult with a disability; 
 (2) . . . assist the adult in accessing, collecting, and obtaining in-
formation that is relevant to a given life decision, including medi-
cal, psychological, financial, educational, or treatment records, 
from any person; 
 (3) assist the adult with a disability in understanding the infor-
mation . . . ; and 
 (4) assist the adult in communicating the adult’s decisions to ap-
propriate persons.194 
The scope of the supported decision-making agreements is similar in the 
other jurisdictions.  Alaska adds that if authorized by the principal, the sup-
                                                          
 192.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9406A(c)(1)–(3) (2018).  Indiana’s statute contains similar pro-
hibitions.  IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-14-5.  Alaska’s statute also contains these prohibitions, with the 
addition that supporters are not permitted to sign for the principal.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.110.  
Wisconsin also prohibits supporters from signing legal documents on behalf of the principal.  WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 52.10(2). 
 193.  Delaware does not have a scope section in its statute, but the scope of the agreement can 
be inferred from other parts of the law, including the language on the agreement form and the section 
on supporters.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9406A(a)(1)–(5).  Similarly, Indiana does not have a 
scope section, but in other parts of the statute, directs supporters to “act within the scope set forth 
in the . . . agreement” and prohibits supporters from “acting outside the scope of authority provided 
in the . . . agreement.”  IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-14-5(a)(3)–(c)(4).  Alaska likewise does not have a 
scope section, but does direct what supporters are able to do, except as limited by the terms of the 
agreement.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.100(a). 
 194.  TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.051(1)–(4) (West 2018).   
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porter can be present when the principal is meeting with others and partici-
pate in the discussion and can advocate to “ensure the implementation of the 
principal’s wishes and decisions.”195 
Texas, Wisconsin, Delaware, and Indiana specify that even if a person 
has an agreement with supporters, they can still access information without 
their supporters.196 
7.  Form of Agreement 
Most statutes either provide the form of the supported decision-making 
agreement or direct that a state agency create a form.197  The Texas statute 
provides the form of the agreement,198 which can also be found on the website 
of the Texas Council for Developmental Disabilities.199  The form is two 
pages, and the agreement begins with a brief description of its purpose, and 
then contains a checklist where the principal can mark “yes” or “no” in what 
areas their supporters may provide assistance in decisionmaking, including: 
“obtaining food, clothing and a place to live”; “physical health”; “mental 
health”; “managing . . . money or property”; “getting an education or other 
training”; “choosing and maintaining . . . services and supports”; “finding a 
job”; and “Other” with space to specify.200  The agreement form also has the 
principal specify whether their supporter can see private health information 
and educational records.201  The second page of the agreement directs people 
presented with the agreement to rely on it, and exempts them from liability 
as long as they rely on it in good faith.202  However, at the end of the agree-
ment, there is a bolded and capitalized heading: “WARNING: 
PROTECTION FOR THE ADULT WITH A DISABILITY.”  This section 
states that if a person presented with the agreement suspects or knows the 
principal is being exploited or abused by their supporter, they are directed to 
                                                          
 195.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.100(a)(3). 
 196.  TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.054(c); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 52.16(5); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
16, § 9404A(c); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-14-4(c). 
 197.  Indiana’s statute has information that must be in the agreement to be presumed to be valid 
but does not contain a template or direct a state agency to create a form.  IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-
14-7(a), 29-3-14-10.  At the time of this writing, Indiana’s state government website that describes 
supported decision-making agreements does not contain a sample agreement.  See Supported Deci-
sion-Making, IN.GOV, https://www.in.gov/gpcpd/2729.htm (last vaccessed Nov. 14, 2019); Sup-
ported Decisionmaking, THE ARC INDIANA, https://www.arcind.org/future-planning/supported-de-
cision-making/ (last accessed Nov. 14, 2019). 
 198.  TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.056. 
 199.  SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AGREEMENT, http://www.tcdd.texas.gov/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/08/Supported-Decision-Making-Agreement-Oct15.pdf (last accessed Nov. 16, 2019). 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id.  
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contact the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, and the De-
partment’s contact information is on the form.203 
The Delaware form has much of the same information.  But it also in-
cludes a bolded and underlined statement that the principal is the legal deci-
sionmaker (“My appointed person(s) does not make decisions for me”), pro-
vides space for the principal to write additional information, and contains a 
section where the principal can specify areas in which they do not want as-
sistance.204  While there is a directive to third parties to report if they think 
the principal needs protective services,205 no contact information for report-
ing is provided. 
While similar to the other states’ forms, the Wisconsin form includes 
“applying for public benefits” and is more specific in identifying supporter’s 
records access, detailing “Medical,” “Psychological,” “Financial,” “Educa-
tion,” “Treatment,” and “Other” records.206  Wisconsin’s form also makes it 
possible for the principal to further customize the supporter’s authority by 
detailing exactly how support will be provided (i.e., the principal can specify 
whether their supporter will have access to information, help them under-
stand information, or help communicate a decision).207  There is no infor-
mation about adult protective services on the form. 
The District of Columbia form, like the Delaware form, directs 
“NOTHING IN THIS DOCUMENT GIVES MY SUPPORTER 
PERMISSION TO MAKE DECISIONS FOR ME.”208  Like the Wisconsin 
form, the D.C. form allows the principal to specify exactly how support will 
be provided, adding a “yes/no” option for the supporter to be present when 
providing decision-making assistance.209  The form also requires that the sup-
porter not only agree to this role, but also affirm that they have not “[a]bused, 
neglected, or exploited” the principal; harmed a child, older person, or person 
with a disability; or been convicted of certain crimes.210  The form ends with 
information about and contact information for adult protective services.211 
                                                          
 203.  Id. 
 204.  SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AGREEMENT—DELAWARE CODE TITLE 16, CHAPTER 
94A, SECTION 9401A, https://www.dhss.delaware.gov/dsaapd/files/supported_decision_mak-
ing_agreement.pdf (last accessed Nov. 16, 2019). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AGREEMENT—2017 WISCONSIN ACT 345—WISCONSIN 
CHAPTER 52, http://wi-bpdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Sample_SDMForm_-5212018.pdf 
(last accessed Nov. 16, 2019). 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AGREEMENT—D.C. CODE §§ 7-2131—2134, 
http://www.supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/files/DC-SDMA-Instruction-Form.pdf (last 
accessed Nov. 16, 2019). 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. 
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Alaska’s statute provides a form but allows for other forms of the agree-
ment that are “substantially similar.”212  Alaska’s form, like some states’ 
forms, says “A SUPPORTER APPOINTED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT 
DOES NOT MAKE DECISIONS FOR ME.”213  The form is six pages in 
length and contains space to nominate three different supporters and an alter-
nate and specify for each of the nominated supporters exactly what kind of 
support they can provide.214  In addition to decision-making domains covered 
in other states’ forms, the Alaska form also includes “[m]aking choices about 
how I spend my time” and “[m]aking choices about legal matters.”215  The 
principal can also authorize decision-making support in additional domains 
(by writing them on the form), and can also specify areas where the principal 
does not authorize support.216  The principal also specifies “yes” or “no” 
about whether the supporters can share information with one another.217  The 
form also requires the permission and signature from a guardian, if the prin-
cipal wishing to enter a supported decision-making agreement is under guard-
ianship, and all supporters must sign the form agreeing to be supporters and 
declaring that they will fulfill their responsibilities under this law.218  The 
fifth section on the agreement, midway through the form, gives a notice to 
third parties about what supported decisionmaking is and that they should 
recognize decisions made with support as the principal’s decisions.219  There 
is no warning to third parties about reporting suspected abuse or neglect.220  
The form also specifies the duration and term of the agreement.221 
8.  Term of Agreement 
Supported decision-making legislation also specifies when supported 
decision-making agreements end.222  Agreements end when terminated by 
either the principal or the supporter.223  In Texas, the agreements also end if: 
                                                          
 212.  STATUTORY FORM FOR SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AGREEMENT, 
http://dhss.alaska.gov/gcdse/Documents/projects/SDMA/SDMA_FORM.pdf (last accessed Nov. 
16, 2019); see also ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.180 (2018). 
 213.  STATUTORY FORM FOR SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AGREEMENT, supra note 212. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Alaska also specifies when supported decision-making agreements begin.  ALASKA STAT. 
§ 13.56.180 (2018). 
 223.  Id. § 13.56.080(a); D.C. CODE § 7-2132(e) (2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-14-9 (West 
2019); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.053(a) (West 2018).  Wisconsin’s law goes into detail about 
the form of revocation of a supported decision-making agreement.  See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
52.14(3)(a)–(c) (West 2018).  
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 (1) the Department of Family and Protective Services finds that 
the adult with a disability has been abused, neglected, or exploited 
by the supporter; 
 (2) the supporter is found criminally liable for [certain] con-
duct . . . ; or 
 (3) a temporary or permanent guardian of the person or estate 
appointed for the adult with a disability qualifies.224 
In Indiana, agreements are terminated if a court finds that the principal 
did not have the capacity to enter the agreement, appoints a plenary guardian 
for the principal, or finds that a supporter used the agreement to financially 
exploit, neglect, or abuse the principal.225  In Wisconsin, agreements also end 
for findings of supporter abuse, neglect, and criminal liability, and if the sup-
porter has a restraining order against them.226  In Delaware, the District of 
Columbia, and Alaska, agreements would presumably end if a supporter no 
longer qualified because they met one of the conditions of disqualification 
discussed previously.227 
9.  Reliance on Agreement and Limitations of Liability 
The Texas, Wisconsin, and District of Columbia supported decision-
making statutes instruct people who are given a copy of the supported deci-
sion-making agreement to rely on it, except if abuse or exploitation is sus-
pected.228  Indiana directs that “[a] request or decision made or communi-
cated with the assistance of a supporter in conformity with this chapter shall 
be recognized as the request or decision of the adult for the purposes of any 
provision of law,”229 and Alaska’s statute contains similar wording.230 
In contrast, Delaware’s statute is silent on whether the agreement should 
be relied upon, but outlines under what conditions people will not be liable if 
they do not rely on the agreement.231  In all states, as long as relying or de-
clining to rely on the agreement is reasonable and in good faith, then a third 
party will not be subject to civil or criminal liability.232  Some states also 
                                                          
 224.  TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.053(b). 
 225.  IND. CODE § 29-3-14-9(4)–(6). 
 226.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 52.14(2).  
 227.  See supra Section III.B.4.  In Delaware, agreements also may be terminated upon a judicial 
determination that the principal cannot make decisions despite assistance.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, 
§ 9405A(i) (2018).   
 228.  TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.101(a); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 52.30(1); D.C. CODE § 7-
2133(d). 
 229.  IND. CODE § 29-3-14-6. 
 230.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.130 (2018). 
 231.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9408A. 
 232.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.140(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9408A; IND. CODE § 29-3-14-
11; TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.101(b); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 52.30(2).  Wisconsin further specifies 
that supporters will not be liable as long as they act with prudence and in good faith.  WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 52.30(8).  Supporters are presumably protected from liability under the general limits to 
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specify that there will be no professional liability (i.e., finding of unprofes-
sional conduct) for good faith reliance on supported decision-making agree-
ments.233 
Some of the supported decision-making statutes contain provisions spe-
cific to healthcare providers.  In Delaware and Alaska, for example, there is 
a conscience exception for healthcare providers.234  Alaska also permits 
healthcare providers to decline to follow their supported patient’s wishes if 
“contrary to [their] good faith medical judgment.”235  Wisconsin outlines ex-
tensive limitations of liability for healthcare providers treating principals 
with a supported decision-making agreement,236 while also directing that pro-
viders are responsible for meeting the standard of care to their patients, acting 
consistent with the wishes of their patient, and relaying sufficient information 
for informed consent to be possible.237 
10.  Mandate to Report Suspected Exploitation or Abuse 
Most supported decision-making laws direct persons presented with 
supported decision-making agreement forms to report any suspected abuse, 
neglect, or exploitation.238 
11.  Relationship of Supported Decisionmaking to Guardianship 
All states have guardianship laws, and in states where supported deci-
sionmaking is an option, persons with disabilities continue to be placed under 
                                                          
liability in other states’ statutes or if they meet the duty of care directed by statute.  See, e.g., DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9406A(d) (defining supporter’s duty of care).  
 233.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.140(a); D.C. CODE § 7-2133(e); IND. CODE § 29-3-14-11(a). 
 234.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9408A (“A person who in good faith acts in reliance on an 
authorization in a supported decision-making agreement, or who in good faith declines to honor an 
authorization in a supported decision-making agreement, is not subject to civil or criminal liability 
or to discipline for unprofessional conduct for . . . [d]eclining to comply with an authorization re-
lated to health care in a supported decision-making agreement because the action proposed to be 
taken under the agreement is contrary to the conscience or good faith medical judgment of the per-
son or to a written policy of a health-care institution that is based on reasons of conscience.”); 
ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.140(a)(3). 
 235.  ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.140(a)(3). 
 236.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 52.30(3). 
 237.  Id. § 52.30(6).  Additionally, healthcare providers must also abide by the ADA and make 
any necessary accommodations for their patients with disabilities.  Id. § 52.30(7). 
 238.  D.C. CODE § 7-2133(f); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-14-13; TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.102 
(West 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 52.32(1).  Delaware’s statute does not contain this directive, but 
its form does.  Neither the text of the Alaska statute nor the template form provided online contain 
this mandate. 
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guardianship,239 and, in fact, may not be eligible for supported decisionmak-
ing if they have a guardian.240  States without supported decision-making 
laws may include a reference to supported decisionmaking in their guardian-
ship statutes, however.241  For example, in Maine, guardians can only be ap-
pointed if a person with a disability has “a limitation in the ability to receive 
and evaluate information or make or communicate decisions even with the 
use of appropriate supportive services, technological assistance and sup-
ported decision making.”242 
Even when supported decisionmaking is not referenced in a state’s stat-
utes, courts may discuss supported decisionmaking when determining 
whether a guardian will be appointed.243  For example, a New York court 
determining whether guardianship continued to be appropriate for a woman 
with an intellectual disability wrote: 
I would find that guardianship is no longer warranted because there 
is now a system of supported decision making in place that consti-
tutes a less restrictive alternate to the Draconian loss of liberty en-
tailed by a plenary 17–A guardianship.  This use of supported de-
cision making . . . is also consistent with . . . Article 12 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabil-
ities (CRPD).244 
Additionally, this court wrote that supported decisionmaking, where 
possible, may be a constitutional guarantee under the New York State Con-
stitution and that “supported decision making must be explored and ex-
hausted before guardianship can be imposed.”245  While this court decision 
does not constitute precedent, it demonstrates the spread of ideas from the 
CRPD and has been influential in later New York Surrogate Court decisions, 
which have used this reasoning to deny guardianship applications.246 
                                                          
 239.  See, e.g., Guardianship of A.E., 552 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex. App. 2018) (“Because sup-
ported decision-making calls for giving a person assistance in understanding the person’s options 
but prohibits a supporter from making decisions for the person, the evidence before the probate 
court established that this alternative is simply not feasible for A.E.”).   
 240.  ALASKA STAT.  § 13.56.010(c); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-14-4(d), 29-3-14-9(6). 
 241.  MO. REV. STAT. § 475.075(13)(4) (2018).  Supported decision-making legislation is often 
part of a state’s guardianship code. 
 242.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-C, § 5-401 (2017). 
 243.  See, e.g., Supported Decision-Making, DISABILITY RIGHTS FLORIDA (Dec. 15, 2016), 
http://www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/podcast/story/episode_5_supported_decision_making.  
 244.  In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 56 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2012). 
 245.  Id. at 856.   
 246.  See, e.g., In re Guardian for Michelle M., 2016 WL 3981204, at *7 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. July 22, 
2016) (“Michelle has an inherent right and ability to make her own choices, with dignity, independ-
ence, and support. . . . To allow Michelle to retain the legal right to make personal decisions about 
her own affairs, while providing her with any necessary assistance to make or communicate those 
decisions in a supported decision-making framework which she already has in place, is ultimately 
in her best interest.”). 
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C.  Applying Supported Decisionmaking to Dementia 
Because supported decisionmaking has only recently been adopted into 
U.S. law, there is not good research on who uses it or how it is used.  But it 
is possible to speculate on how it could be applied to persons with dementia.  
Supported decisionmaking for persons with dementia would likely occur as 
follows.  When a person with dementia realized they had cognitive impair-
ments and that their decision-making capacity would decline over time,247 
the individual could opt to find people to formally agree to support them in 
instances where they need assistance with understanding information, mak-
ing decisions, or communicating decisions to others.  As long as a proposed 
supporter agreed and met the necessary state requirements, then when called 
upon by the person with dementia, the supporter would provide any requested 
decision-making assistance. 
In the healthcare context, the patient with dementia would present to 
their physician or other healthcare providers a copy of the supported deci-
sion-making agreement.  The agreement would inform providers that the per-
son with dementia is the rightful healthcare decisionmaker and that they have 
supporters rather than surrogates, and it would also specify what kind of pri-
vate healthcare information their supporter should have access to.  The pa-
tient with dementia would then be able to make their own healthcare deci-
sions, with any necessary supports, even if under the typical surrogate 
decision-making model, they would be determined to not have decisional ca-
pacity and a surrogate would decide for them.  If the patient later became 
unable to make or communicate decisions even with support, then surrogates 
(who may have been the supporter) could decide on the patient’s behalf. 
IV.  OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
There may be significant concerns about shifting from surrogate to sup-
ported decisionmaking for persons with dementia.  Some of these concerns 
are specific to dementia, and some are about supported decisionmaking gen-
erally; some are practical, and some are philosophical.  Before changing law 
and practice, it is important to consider and address these concerns.  This Part 
first focuses on more practical concerns, such as how supported decisionmak-
ing can best be applied to persons with dementia.  This Part then addresses 
more philosophical issues with dementia and decisionmaking, such as 
changes to personal identity after the onset of dementia. 
                                                          
 247.  This would likely occur at the time of a dementia diagnosis.  A person with dementia could 
opt in to supported decisionmaking at any point in their illness, however, even if they previously 
relied on surrogates or agents.   
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A.  Supported Decisionmaking Is Appropriate for Many but Not All 
Persons with Dementia 
This Section addresses concerns that supported decisionmaking is not 
possible for persons with dementia given the nature of this disability.  While 
this Article contends that supported decisionmaking can work for many per-
sons with dementia, depending upon the stage of the illness and the prefer-
ences of particular patients, this model will not always be appropriate. 
1.  Supported Decisionmaking Can Be Useful for Many Persons with 
Dementia 
There is debate in the scholarly and policy literature about whether sup-
ported decisionmaking is appropriate or even possible for persons with de-
mentia.  For example, questions arise about whether a decision-making 
model that arose in the context of “the needs of young adults with develop-
mental and intellectual disabilities”248 will work for persons with demen-
tia.249 
It is crucial to emphasize that supported decisionmaking may not be 
welcome for all persons with MCI or dementia.250  For persons with only 
mild decisional impairments, there is no legal or clinical need for anyone to 
be involved in a healthcare decision besides the patient and their physician 
(although such persons may invite others into the process, if this is their de-
cision-making preference).251  Indeed, it is important to underscore that this 
                                                          
 248.  Hall, supra note 81, at 346.   
 249.  As others have noted, the experiences and abilities of persons who have cognitive disabil-
ities differ greatly.  Mary Donnelly, A Legal Overview, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA, 
supra note 11, at 271, 272; Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1132, 1133.  Additionally, it is likely that 
the experience of supported decisionmaking will differ for persons who were previously able to 
make their own decisions (e.g., older persons with dementia) and those who are able to make their 
own decisions for the first time (e.g., persons with Down Syndrome who attain the age of majority).  
Diller, supra note 11, at 525. 
 250.  See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 251.  Medical organizations acknowledge that persons with early-stage dementia may be fully 
capable of making their own decisions.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 45.  Clinical 
practice may need to change to ensure surrogates are not necessary, however.  For example, a clini-
cian may need to slow down when talking to patients with dementia.  Or appointments may need to 
be scheduled for when a patient with dementia tends to experience fewer impairments, which may 
mean conversations should occur in the morning.  Nina Khachiyants et al., Sundown Syndrome in 
Persons with Dementia: An Update, 8 PSYCHIATRY INVESTIGATION 275 (2011); see also 
CASTLEMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 245–46 (providing advice for communicating with a person 
with dementia); GLENNER ET AL., supra note 84, at 39–41; Cheryl Dellasega et al., Medical Deci-
sion-Making Capacity in Elderly Hospitalized Patients, 2 J. ETHICS L. & AGING 65 (1996) (describ-
ing how to accommodate older adults in medical crisis by altering communication style to ensure 
understanding); J.B. Orange & Ellen Bouchard Ryan, Alzheimer’s Disease and Other Dementias: 
Implications for Physician Communication, 16 CLINICS GERIATRIC MED. 153 (2000); J. Perry et 
al., Nurse-Patient Communication in Dementia: Improving the Odds, 31 J. GERONTOLOGICAL 
NURSING 43 (2005); Megan S. Wright, Dementia, Healthcare Decision Making, and Disability 
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Article does not argue for abolishing existing healthcare decision-making 
laws.  Instead, this Article argues that existing laws be properly applied to 
ensure that autonomy is respected.  Existing law only permits surrogate de-
cisionmaking when someone is adjudicated incompetent, is found to lack de-
cision-making capacity after an assessment, or intentionally and voluntarily 
defers to others in decisionmaking.252  This means that persons who have 
been diagnosed with MCI or who have early stage dementia where decisional 
impairments are likely mild should not be prevented from making their own 
healthcare decisions because they most likely retain decision-making capac-
ity, under clinical criteria, and do not have a guardian.253  For example, even 
if a person can no longer easily do arithmetic calculations or periodically ex-
periences confusion, common symptoms of mild AD, they likely can still 
communicate preferences and make choices about medical treatment.  As the 
World Health Organization noted, “the presence of dementia should not be 
justification for assuming a person cannot make decisions in all aspects of 
his/her life.”254 
Unfortunately, persons with dementia are often denied the opportunity 
to make their own decisions, even when entitled to under current healthcare 
decision-making law.255  To ensure that persons with MCI or mild dementia 
are protected against clinicians or family members who may find it incon-
venient to allow them to participate in decisionmaking256 or who may misun-
derstand healthcare decision-making law,257 persons with dementia should 
enter into supported decision-making agreements, which proclaim their legal 
decision-making capacity, upon diagnosis of MCI or dementia.  The agree-
ments, which direct physicians to follow them, can be used as a shield against 
marginalization and a sword of empowerment as persons with dementia de-
mand the legal right to make or participate in healthcare decisions.  That is, 
supported decisionmaking, even when a person has decisional capacity under 
current capacity assessment criteria, can be a prophylactic measure to ensure 
that persons with dementia retain autonomy in healthcare settings.258 
Given the functional impairments dementia causes, however, as demen-
tia progresses many persons may need assistance in making decisions based 
                                                          
Law, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 25, 29 (2019) (describing accommodations to healthcare decisionmak-
ing for persons with disabilities). 
 252.  See UHCDA, supra note 2. 
 253.  Moye et al., supra note 139. 
 254.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 45. 
 255.  See supra Section I.C. 
 256.  Charlie Murphy, The Experience of People with Dementia in Community Services, in THE 
PERSON WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE, supra note 10, at 187, 207 (“Often it can seem more conven-
ient for the staff to assume that individuals with dementia have little or no insight.”). 
 257.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1148. 
 258.  The presence of the agreement should be sufficient to ensure that persons who do not want 
anyone else involved in their healthcare decisionmaking can assert their legal capacity.  The use of 
supporters is always optional. 
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on their interests and preferences.259  While some scholars have summarily 
dismissed supported decisionmaking for persons with dementia,260 it is im-
portant to remember that dementia is a syndrome, and there is significant 
variation in the experience of persons with dementia.261  The symptoms of 
dementia will differ by type and stage, and its impacts will differ depending 
upon a person’s psychological attributes and social context, meaning that it 
is likely supported decisionmaking would be both appropriate and possible 
for some persons with dementia.  And indeed, studies have demonstrated that 
persons with dementia can reliably convey their preferences, values, and ex-
periences, which would make supported decisionmaking possible.262  There 
is thus no reason to automatically presume that a typical person with moder-
ate AD, for example, would be unable to be supported in healthcare deci-
sionmaking.263  Even if cognitive impairments are more severe, if a person 
had high levels of cognitive resources prior to the onset of dementia, adequate 
support may be sufficient to aid in decisionmaking.264 
Additionally, informal supported decisionmaking is a process to which 
most people are already accustomed, and so this model may not require ad-
justment for persons with dementia, in contrast to surrogate decisionmaking.  
As noted previously, research has demonstrated that, in practice, many peo-
ple make important decisions—especially about their healthcare—in consul-
tation and collaboration with others.265  Consulting and collaborating with 
other people in decisionmaking is exactly what supported decisionmaking is, 
albeit in a much more formalized manner given the use of a legal contract.  
                                                          
 259.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 645.  Needing assistance to decide on the basis of contempo-
raneous values and interests is not incompatible with autonomy, however.  Jaworska, supra note 4, 
at 126. 
 260.  One scholar wrote, “Co or supported decision-making models . . . are not compatible with 
the embodied nature of dementia.” Hall, supra note 81, at 346. 
 261.  KITWOOD, supra note 43, at 84–85. 
 262.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1143, 1151–53; see also POWELL, supra note 4, at 16 (relaying 
an anecdote that could be considered informal supported decisionmaking for a person with severe 
dementia). 
 263.  A person with moderate dementia may need help with activities of daily living, such as 
toileting and getting dressed, and may exhibit greater confusion and memory loss, but with assis-
tance from trusted supporters, may be able to talk about their healthcare preferences, understand 
their medical options, and convey their choices.  Using supported decisionmaking would require 
that the person with dementia not be inappropriately sedated, however.  Fox et al., supra note 11, at 
74–75, 78–81. 
 264.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to detail the exact process of how healthcare decisions 
in a clinical setting would be made with support.  There is too much variation in the experience of 
dementia, and too many kinds of healthcare choices, to tackle this.  But for an example of informal 
supported decisionmaking for a person with advanced dementia, see, POWELL, supra note 4, at 16; 
see also Using Supported Decision Making in Health Care: Frequently Asked Questions for Persons 
with Disabilities, Family Members, Friends, and Supporters, NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, 
https://www.ndrn.org/resource/faqs-for-people-with-disabilities-and-their-family-members-sup-
ported-decision-making-and-health-care/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2019) (listing examples of how sup-
port can be provided in healthcare setting).  
 265.  Wright, supra note 20. 
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Supported decisionmaking thus facilitates the continuation of a familiar 
mode of decisionmaking even after the onset of a condition that impairs cog-
nition.  If used in the context of dementia, supported decisionmaking may 
increase the likelihood that persons with dementia are treated the same as 
persons without dementia. 
2.  Surrogate Decision-making and Guardianship Laws Should be 
Retained and Include Supported Decision-making Principles 
Despite the desire of some advocates for persons with disabilities to 
abolish surrogate decisionmaking,266 this decision-making model is some-
times appropriate and necessary.267  In the case of dementia, there may come 
a point in this degenerative disorder when a person becomes nonverbal.268  
Not being able to speak is not a bar to using supported decisionmaking, how-
ever, if the person with dementia can still gesture or otherwise behaviorally 
manifest desires, preferences, and choices.269  But for some persons, demen-
tia will progress to the point where it is not possible for them to communi-
cate.270  When communicative abilities are completely lost or uninterpretable 
in late stage dementia, supported decisionmaking will not be possible, and a 
surrogate will be required, whether the surrogate is a family member or a 
guardian appointed by a court.271  But if a surrogate was previously a sup-
porter, they likely have a good sense of how best to make decisions on the 
basis of the values and preferences of the person with dementia.272 
Also, some persons with dementia may not have anyone in their lives 
who can serve as a supporter.  This may be because they have no family or 
friends,273 or because potential supporters are disqualified under state law 
(for example, they have abused or neglected the person with dementia) or are 
otherwise unwilling or unable to be a supporter (perhaps they too have a cog-
nitive disability).  In these instances, guardians may still need to be ap-
pointed.274   
                                                          
 266.  ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, supra note 154, at 74.   
 267.  For example, if a person is unconscious, no amount of support will aid them in deci-
sionmaking.   
 268.  Diller, supra note 11, at 533–34 (describing how not all persons with dementia can be 
supported); Snyder, supra note 91, at 129 (“[A]s the disease advances communication . . . may be-
come more symbolic or may shift from verbal to more behavioral or gestures.”). 
 269.  See Kathleen Kahn-Denis, The Person with Dementia and Artwork: Art Therapy, in THE 
PERSON WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE, supra note 10, at 246 (describing how persons with dementia 
can use art to express themselves and relate to others). 
 270.  Herring, supra note 129, at 303.  They may also no longer have preferences or any aware-
ness at all.  In other cases, a person may die from other causes before dementia reaches this stage. 
 271.  Schmidt, supra note 70, at 321. 
 272.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 45. 
 273.  See Diller, supra note 11, at 522 (describing social isolation of older persons). 
 274.  Some have argued for professionalizing support for instances such as this, however.  Ste-
phen A. Rosenbaum, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 61 (2019) (reviewing ANNA ARSTEIN-KERSLAKE, 
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Because surrogate decisionmaking will sometimes be necessary, laws 
facilitating surrogate decisionmaking are also necessary.  Additionally, these 
laws should be retained because people should be able to voluntarily opt out 
of decisionmaking if they prefer others to decide for them, as this choice is 
also an exercise of autonomy the law should respect.  Indeed, some studies 
have found that older patients may have this preference.275  Because some 
persons with dementia who are able to make their own decisions, with or 
without support, may prefer to defer to others, supported decisionmaking 
should be optional rather than mandatory.276 
Given the need to retain surrogate decision-making and guardianship 
law and the importance of self-determination to persons with dementia, prin-
ciples of supported decisionmaking should be built into these laws.  That is, 
where possible, surrogates and guardians should support persons with disa-
bilities in making their own decisions rather than taking over the decision-
making process.277  For example, while a guardian may be the legal deci-
sionmaker, the guardian could inform the person with dementia about possi-
ble medical options along with the expected benefits and burdens, obtain 
feedback from the person with dementia about their preferences, and try to 
decide on the basis of these preferences, even if the guardian legally could 
decide otherwise. 
B.  Supported Decisionmaking Should Be Institutionalized in Law 
A large-scale shift from surrogate to supported decisionmaking will re-
quire significant institutional and cultural change and may be costly.  This 
Section addresses these concerns and argues that supported decisionmaking 
for patients with dementia should still be adopted into law. 
                                                          
RESTORING VOICE TO PEOPLE WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES: REALIZING THE RIGHT TO EQUAL 
RECOGNITION BEFORE THE LAW (2017)). 
 275.  Sinoff & Blaja-Lisnic, supra note 61, at 98.  This means surrogate decision-making laws 
are needed to facilitate satisfaction of this preference. 
 276.  This is also culturally competent as people from some cultural groups may prefer others 
(e.g., family members or physicians) to make healthcare decisions on their behalf.  INST. OF MED., 
DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE 
END OF LIFE 150 (2015). 
 277.  Guardians are directed to do so in the most recent version of the Uniform Guardianship, 
Conservatorship, and Other Protective Arrangements Act.  UGCOPPA, supra note 80, at 
§ 313(b)(2). 
  States should modify their existing healthcare decision-making laws to privilege supported 
decisionmaking before surrogates are asked to decide on the basis of prior wishes, substituted judg-
ments, or best interests of persons with impaired cognition.  This direction would function similarly 
to how supported decisionmaking is referenced in some state’s guardianship statutes.  See supra 
Section III.B.11. 
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1.  How to Institutionalize Supported Decisionmaking for Patients 
with Dementia 
Supported decisionmaking is codified in the laws of only a few states.  
Advocates should push for more states to adopt supported decision-making 
legislation or at least amend their healthcare decision-making statutes to in-
clude a mandate to explore supported decisionmaking before turning to a sur-
rogate.278  Even if other states adopt supported decisionmaking, however, 
there is no guarantee that this decision-making model would be widely used 
by persons with dementia.279  There is also no guarantee that other parties 
would respect the supported decision-making agreements.280 
The training and practice of various professionals will need to change 
in order for supported, rather than surrogate, decisionmaking to be institu-
tionalized in the United States.  Elder law, estate, and disability attorneys 
who help their clients plan for loss of capacity should be aware that supported 
decisionmaking is a complement to durable power of attorneys, healthcare 
agents, and living wills.  Elder law and estate attorneys should fold discussion 
of supported decisionmaking into the services they provide their clients.  If 
the attorney has an ongoing relationship with their client, conversations about 
supported decisionmaking should occur well before the onset of any disabil-
ity that impairs cognition in order to normalize this option and help people 
think carefully about who in their social network they trust to assist in deci-
sionmaking.  And if a client seeks guidance for the first time shortly after a 
diagnosis of dementia, the attorney should educate their client on supported 
decisionmaking, given that most people will likely not have a prior under-
standing of this model, and thus may not know to ask about it. 
The standardized power of attorney and living will forms provided by 
states should also be modified to include a supported decision-making agree-
ment.  People who plan for a future where they may have a disability, but 
who do not have an attorney, may search for these forms online, and if the 
supported decision-making agreement is part of the form, then more people 
will be aware of and use this model. 
Probate judges also should undergo training about supported deci-
sionmaking as these judges are responsible for deeming a person incompetent 
and appointing guardians and conservators.  Given that some states have 
                                                          
 278.  It is preferable to have separate legislation, however, because extensive directions, grants 
of authority, and limitations of liability can be outlined. 
 279.  Even in states that have supported decision-making laws, lawyers and healthcare providers 
may not realize that persons with dementia can benefit from them. 
 280.  Indeed, there is evidence that even legal changes that are meant to promote greater partic-
ipation in decisionmaking by persons with cognitive disabilities may not change decision-making 
practices, even by legal actors.  Donnelly, supra note 249, at 276.  Additionally, there is evidence 
that healthcare providers do not respect existing legal documents, such as advance directives.  Davis, 
supra note 4, at 745. 
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amended their guardianship laws to emphasize that least restrictive alterna-
tives, including supported decisionmaking, should be explored prior to ap-
pointing a guardian,281 judges should be familiar with how supported deci-
sionmaking works so that guardians are not appointed for people who have 
the ability to make decisions with adequate support and accommodations. 
A more significant issue is whether legal change will change clinical 
practice, which is not overseen by courts.282  Healthcare providers will also 
need to be informed and trained about supported decisionmaking.  Physicians 
and other providers diagnose dementia and (if following best practices) then 
advise their patients to engage in advance care planning.283  The point of di-
agnosis and recommendation to plan for loss of capacity is a prime oppor-
tunity to inform patients about supported decisionmaking, perhaps by making 
a medical social worker available to explain how it compares to surrogate 
decisionmaking.  Without an understanding of how other legal tools, such as 
a supported decision-making agreement, can ensure that patients with deci-
sional impairments are able to make their own healthcare decisions, 
healthcare providers may be the first actors who treat the person with demen-
tia as demented and thus incapable, interacting with the patient only through 
the patient’s family members upon diagnosis.284  Clinicians should be trained 
to talk directly to their patients with dementia and expect that they, rather 
than a family member, are the proper decisionmaker.285 
Understanding supported decisionmaking and acknowledging that their 
patient is the rightful healthcare decisionmaker may make healthcare provid-
ers more likely to provide respectful, person-centered care to their patients 
with dementia.  And given the rise in academic writing that asserts that shared 
decisionmaking, which shares similarities with supported decisionmaking, is 
a best clinical practice, healthcare providers may be more open to supported 
decisionmaking.286  But there is also the possibility that clinicians may 
                                                          
 281.  See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-28-04 (2017). 
 282.  Donnelly, supra note 249, at 277 (“[D]elivery on the legal standard is largely dependent 
on the people who are providing care on the ground.”). 
 283.  There is inconsistency in messaging to clinicians about what information they should give 
to and how they should interact with their patients with dementia.  On the one hand, advance care 
planning is recommended, which emphasizes precedent autonomy.  See, e.g., Bregnan & Moore, 
supra note 92; Fox et al., supra note 11.  On the other hand, clinicians are advised to recognize the 
agency and independence of their patients, which emphasizes current interests.  Bregnan & Moore, 
supra note 92; Fox et al., supra note 11, at 75. 
 284.  See BEARD, supra note 18; Young, supra note 10, at 39–40 (finding that patients with AD 
report their healthcare providers do not communicate with them directly). 
 285.  This is consistent with the nondiscrimination mandate in the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.  See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 286.  But efforts to get physicians to engage in shared decisionmaking have not been successful, 
which is not promising news for trying to change how physicians interact with their patients.  INST. 
OF MED., supra note 276, at 351.  Supported decisionmaking would have the force of law, however, 
so perhaps its implementation would be more successful.  It also may be beneficial to focus educa-
tion efforts on medical students if the existing medical culture is resistant to viewing patients with 
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choose not to respect patient choices,287 which is a more difficult problem to 
tackle.  Supported decisionmaking may be a partial solution to this problem, 
however, because strong supporters can insist that clinicians respect the prin-
cipal. 
Through advocacy efforts, large and influential organizations such as 
the Alzheimer’s Association or AARP may also provide the necessary impe-
tus for cultural, professional practice, and legal change.288  But such organi-
zations must be convinced that supported decisionmaking is good for their 
membership.289  To this end, a public relations campaign emphasizing that 
persons with dementia retain significant abilities despite their impairments 
may be useful.290 
2.  Supported Decisionmaking Should Be Implemented Even If It 
Adds Administrative Burdens 
Some skeptics of the feasibility of supported decisionmaking may be 
concerned that healthcare providers will not be receptive to this model be-
cause it could be administratively burdensome.  Dementia can cause commu-
nication issues, including “problems with aphasia, word finding, and sen-
tence completion.”291  Supported decisionmaking may therefore require more 
time to accommodate a patient’s disability,292 and it may be more efficient 
for providers to communicate only with surrogates.  Prior research has 
demonstrated that “[w]ell-intentioned caregivers often ‘take over’ tasks from 
[people with dementia], especially when the individual is struggling or frus-
trated by a task.”293  There may be a similar tendency from supporters and 
                                                          
dementia as capable of making their own healthcare decisions.  Medical practice may then change 
for future generations of physicians.   
 287.  Schmidt, supra note 70, at 313 (describing studies that demonstrate that patient instructions 
are not followed).   
 288.  Additionally, books targeted toward family members and informal caregivers of persons 
with dementia could also discuss supported decisionmaking as a complement to other types of ad-
vance care planning commonly advised.  See, e.g., CASTLEMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 105–06, 
274–75. 
 289.  See Diller, supra note 11, at 498–99 (describing the need for stakeholder buy-in). 
 290.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27. 
 291.  Robyn Yale & Lisa Snyder, The Experience of Support Groups for Persons with Early-
Stage Alzheimer’s Disease and Their Families, in THE PERSON WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE, supra 
note 10, at 228, 239.   
 292.  See Arwen H. Pieterse et al., Shared Decision Making and the Importance of Time, 322 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 25 (2019) (describing how a barrier to adoption of a similar decision-making 
model is lack of time). 
 293.  Rebecca G. Logsdon, Making the Most of Every Day: Quality of Life, in THE PERSON WITH 
ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE, supra note 10, at 75, 83.  
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healthcare providers to “take over” rather than support a person with demen-
tia in making a healthcare decision.294 
But what is most convenient for providers should not determine whether 
supported decisionmaking is used in a healthcare setting.  The decisive ques-
tion is to what are patients with dementia entitled, and the answer is the op-
portunity to make their own healthcare decisions.295  There are both legal and 
ethical sources for this right.  For example, if correctly applied, existing 
healthcare decision-making law entitles persons with dementia who still have 
decisional capacity to make their own healthcare decisions.  Additionally, 
under the ADA, which requires reasonable accommodations to ensure that 
persons with disabilities can participate in decisions about their healthcare,296 
persons with dementia may be legally entitled to appropriate decision-mak-
ing assistance and accommodations.297  And ethical principles such as equal 
respect for persons under the law and respect for patient autonomy and self-
determination similarly support the proposition that persons with dementia 
should not be prevented from making their own healthcare decisions.298 
If there is concern that law is insufficient to ensure that physicians re-
spect the decision-making authority of their patients with dementia, policy-
makers may consider monetary incentives to change physician behavior.  For 
example, there could be changes to Medicare to allow healthcare providers 
to bill for additional time spent accommodating supported decisionmak-
ing.299  Additionally, other clinicians, such as nurse practitioners, physician 
                                                          
 294.  Experts thus advise that when talking to someone with dementia, people should “avoid run-
on sentences or raising many questions and points all at once.  Allow silence or extra time for par-
ticipants to find their words.”  Yale & Snyder, supra note 291, at 239.  For other advice for com-
municating with persons with dementia, see CASTLEMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 39–41; GLENNER 
ET AL., supra note 84, at 39–41; Dellasega et al., supra note 251; Orange & Ryan, supra note 251; 
Perry et al., supra note 251. 
 295.  Clinicians may argue that there are some medical situations in which there is not time to 
use supported decisionmaking because a decision must be made immediately.  While this may be 
the case in some situations, it is important not to let this rarity become routine justification for 
denying persons with disabilities the opportunity to make their own healthcare decisions. 
 296.  See, e.g., Megan S. Wright & Joseph J. Fins, Rehabilitation, Education, and the Integration 
of Individuals with Severe Brain Injury into Civil Society: Towards an Expanded Rights Agenda in 
Response to New Insights from Translational Neuroethics and Neuroscience, 16 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 233 (2016).  But see Nicole D. Agaronnik et al., Knowledge of Practicing Phy-
sicians About Their Legal Obligations when Caring for Patients with Disability, 38 HEALTH AFF. 
545, 547–50 (2019) (finding that physicians are ignorant of their obligations under the ADA). 
 297.  Wright, supra note 251, at 28–29. 
 298.  See supra Section II.A. 
 299.  But see Megan S. Wright, Change Without Change? Assessing Medicare Reimbursement 
for Advance Care Planning, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP., May–June 2018, at 8 (showing little effect of 
reimbursement on physicians billing for advance care planning).  Ideas about how to pay for col-
laborative dementia care are currently being debated.  See, e.g., Malaz Boustani et al., An Alternative 
Payment Model to Support Widespread Use of Collaborative Dementia Care Models, 38 HEALTH 
AFF., Jan. 2019, at 54.  
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assistants, and social workers, may be able to take on some of the communi-
cation with persons with dementia and their supporters. 
3.  Formality of Law Is Necessary 
One objection to the argument that persons with dementia should be en-
couraged to enter formal supported decision-making agreements is that doing 
so signals a lack of respect for rights-bearing adults with mild dementia who 
are entitled to make their own healthcare decisions under current law.  Some 
may argue that supported decisionmaking should be more informal and relied 
upon only when necessary (i.e., the person lacks decisional capacity but can 
still communicate preferences). 
It is worth emphasizing again that persons with MCI and mild dementia, 
who still retain significant cognitive abilities, are entitled to make their own 
decisions under current healthcare decision-making law, which is premised 
on decisional capacity.300  But, as noted previously, these individuals’ capac-
ity is often disregarded, and they are excluded by physicians and family 
members from the decision-making process.301  Supported decisionmaking 
can be a legal tool that counters the marginalization of persons with dementia.  
Further, encouraging the routine practice of supported decisionmaking is a 
worthy ideal even for persons without cognitive impairments, as it matches 
relational healthcare decision-making preferences.302 
Additionally, for persons with moderate dementia, who under existing 
healthcare decision-making law are not entitled to make their own decisions 
at the time they must be made because they lack decisional capacity, physi-
cians may be uncomfortable with supported decisionmaking if this model is 
not found in law.  This discomfort may be because physicians fear liability if 
they permit a patient with moderate dementia to make their own healthcare 
decisions that ultimately lead to a decline in health or death.303  Supported 
decision-making legislation includes limits to liability for reasonable and 
good faith reliance on supported decision-making agreements.304  To increase 
the likelihood of physician buy-in, supported decisionmaking should be for-
malized in law, with the accompanying limits to liability. 
                                                          
 300.  See UHCDA, supra note 2. 
 301.  See supra Section I.C. 
 302.  Indeed, supported decisionmaking shares similarities with shared decisionmaking, which 
is preferred by many patients.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, 1146–48; Wright, supra note 20, at 1089. 
 303.  See also Behrens, supra note 108 (finding that healthcare providers privilege patient safety 
over honoring patient preferences because of liability concerns). 
  Providers also may be concerned about relying on a supported decision-making agreement 
if it conflicts with the wishes of their patient prior to dementia.  See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 70, 
at 313 (describing sanctions for wrongful life lawsuits and other tort, contract, and criminal claims).   
 304.  See supra Section II.B.9. 
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C.  Addressing Concerns About Financial Exploitation, Undue 
Influence, and Coercion 
While exploitation and abuse of older persons and persons with disabil-
ities is a general concern,305 there may be reasons to suppose that persons 
with dementia are especially vulnerable to financial exploitation.306  This is 
because they may have accumulated significant financial assets over their life 
course, in contrast to many people who have developmental or intellectual 
disabilities starting at a young age.  Financial assets along with impaired cog-
nition may make persons with dementia a target for exploitation, and the pro-
gressive nature of dementia means that the risk of exploitation will increase 
over time. 
Importantly, such exploitation may not be directly related to financial 
decisions, but could also occur in the healthcare decision-making process, 
given that medical treatment has financial implications.  As elder law attor-
neys caution, “[i]t is almost inevitable that the medical interests of the indi-
vidual with disabilities and the financial interests of the heirs will conflict 
because the more money spent on caretaking, the less there will be to in-
herit.”307 
Supported decision-making agreements could be used as a means of fi-
nancial exploitation.308  This should only occur if persons presented with it 
are not familiar with supported decisionmaking, and understand the agree-
ment to be a power of attorney, deferring to the supporter who is incorrectly 
viewed as an agent.309  It is important to understand, however, that this risk 
of exploitation and undue influence is not unique to supported decisionmak-
ing.  Existing legal tools, such as a power of attorney and guardianship, may 
make it easier to financially exploit someone.310  In fact, of all the decision-
making options that involve another party, supported decisionmaking may do 
the most to reduce the risk of exploitation because the person with a disability 
remains the final decisionmaker (assuming the details of the agreement are 
followed).311 
Beyond the context of financial exploitation, other concerns about the 
exploitation of persons with disabilities arise.  Supporters may exert undue 
                                                          
 305.  Marshall B. Kapp, Aging Population, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW, 
supra note 59, at 1053, 1064–65. 
 306.  See KENNY, supra note 36, at 51–54; Arias, supra note 81, at 156–57 (recommending fi-
nancial guardianship). 
 307.  PECK & LAW, supra note 12, at 237–38; Wright, supra note 20, at 1129. 
 308.  Diller, supra note 11, at 535–37. 
 309.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1137. 
 310.  PECK & LAW, supra note 12, at 286; Schmidt, supra note 70, at 313–14. 
 311.  But see Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1137 (arguing that supported decisionmaking has 
“less accountability” than guardianship given that the agreement and decision-making context are 
private). 
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influence, coerce persons with decisional impairments,312 or even engage in 
abuse, all of which violate the purpose of supported decisionmaking, which 
is promoting the self-determination of the principal.  As scholars have cau-
tioned, “there is reason to be concerned that supported decision-making may 
allow largely unaccountable third parties to improperly influence the deci-
sions of persons with disabilities, thereby disempowering persons with disa-
bilities and undermining their rights.”313 
It is necessary to acknowledge that the interests of the person with de-
mentia and their supporter may conflict,314 especially if the supporter is also 
an informal caregiver.  It may be difficult for caregiving supporters to respect 
the choices of the person with dementia if these choices could result in a 
decrease in wellbeing.315  It may also be difficult for supporters to respect 
choices that increase burdens on themselves in their caregiving capacity.316 
If supporters are family members, however, the person with dementia 
may not mind taking into account their supporter’s interests, because the in-
terests of all parties often are considered in family relationships.317  Further-
more, some argue that the interests of caregivers should be considered when 
making decisions with or for a person with dementia.318  If in providing sup-
ported decisionmaking, the caregiving supporter discusses the impact of a 
decision on themselves or others, the principal may wish to decide, in part, 
on the basis of this information, just as they may choose to do if they did not 
have impaired decision-making capacity.319  As Professor Herring has noted, 
                                                          
 312.  Undue influence is not always a product of bad faith.  Id. (“Through particular issue-fram-
ing, inaccurate assessment of the principal’s preferences, or simple conversational style, a discus-
sion may easily be led one way or another to an outcome that does not accurately reflect the princi-
pal’s preferences.”); see also Liz Blackler, Compromised Autonomy: When Families Pressure 
Patients to Change Their Wishes, 18 J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE NURSING 284, 284 (2016) (describ-
ing family pressure). 
 313.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1157. 
 314.  Karen Eltis, The Use of New Technologies in the Management of Dementia Patients, in 
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 433, 434–35 (“[A]lthough it is naturally 
presumed that patients and caregivers share common interests, that is not always the case . . . .”). 
 315.  Id. at 437 (“[C]aregivers . . . are generally said to value non-malfeasance over what are 
perceived to be more abstract rights.  That perception might overshadow the dementia patient’s 
nonmedical considerations . . . that may be conveniently dismissed as capricious or unimportant 
compared with physical safety . . . .”). 
 316.  Empirical studies have demonstrated that there can be significant strain as a result of caring 
for a person with dementia.  Rosie Harding, Dementia and Carers: Relationality and Informal Car-
ers’ Experiences, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 379, 387; see POWELL, 
supra note 4, at 198–99 (questioning how to balance the needs of caregivers and persons with de-
mentia). 
 317.  See Wright, supra note 20 (discussing this in the end-of-life decision-making context). 
 318.  Harding, supra note 316, at 389; see Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients, supra 
note 3, at 395–97 (describing how best interests analyses often do account for family interests); 
Herring, supra note 129, at 306 (arguing that best interests analyses should also be relational). 
 319.  Families may be concerned about permitting their loved ones with dementia to make their 
own decisions because the decisions could negatively affect family members.  But while healthcare 
decisions may impact others, they are properly made by the person who bears the primary burdens 
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“[f]ew people would be happy with the idea that if they were to fall incom-
petent, a decision would have to be made if it benefitted them a little bit, even 
if that caused grave harm to the person caring for them.”320  Indeed, persons 
with dementia may wish to act altruistically.321 
But given the potential for supported decision-making agreements and 
practices to result in financial or other harm to persons with dementia, con-
sidering how to prevent exploitation, coercion, and abuse is necessary.322  
The focus should not be on limiting the liberty of persons with dementia, but 
instead on limiting the likelihood that others will harm the person with de-
mentia.323  
There are existing safeguards in supported decision-making law in the 
United States that may be helpful for reducing the likelihood of harm to the 
principal.324  For example, under some current state laws, certain people are 
prohibited from serving as supporters, such as those who have an order of 
protection against them or have abused or neglected the principal in the 
past.325  Additionally, most supported decision-making agreements also have 
a section addressed to third parties that directs those who suspect abuse, ne-
glect, or exploitation of the principal to contact state protective services.326  
Protective services agencies are thus a good complement to supported deci-
sionmaking, given concerns about the wellbeing of persons with dementia.  
                                                          
and benefits of the decision (the patient).  Supported decisionmaking could assuage some family’s 
concerns about effects of decisions on third parties, however, because while this model permits the 
person with dementia to make their own decisions, the information a supporter can provide about 
the potential effects of the decision on others allows the person with dementia to determine which 
third parties’ interests are relevant for their decision. 
 320.  Herring, supra note 129, at 306; see also HERRING, supra note 72, at 13 (“Clearly people 
do value their relationships greatly and do not see life as simply about pursuing one’s own goals.”); 
Wright, supra note 20. 
 321.  HERRING, supra note 72, at 48–49; Herring, supra note 129, at 307.  Indeed, there are many 
studies documenting the altruism of people with dementia.  See, e.g., Phyllis Braudy Harris & Casey 
Durkin, Building Resilience Through Coping and Adapting, in THE PERSON WITH ALZHEIMER’S 
DISEASE, supra note 10, at 165; Murphy, supra note 256; Jane Stansell, Volunteerism: Contributions 
by Persons with Alzheimer’s Disease, in THE PERSON WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE, supra note 10, 
at 211.  
 322.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 45. 
 323.  Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual 
and Societal Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 71, 94 (2012). 
 324.  It is important to acknowledge that some persons with disabilities do not trust the legal 
system to value their lives and so are not assuaged by the existence of legal and procedural safe-
guards.  Jerome E. Bickenbach, Disability and Life-Ending Decisions, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED 
SUICIDE: EXPANDING THE DEBATE 123 (Margaret P. Battin et al. eds. 1998); Crossley, supra note 
151, at 909–10. 
 325.  See supra Section III.B.4. 
 326.  See supra Section III.B.10.  All states have elder abuse laws, and some scholars have ques-
tioned whether such laws reinforce stigma against older persons.  KAPP, supra note 73, at 165–69; 
Kapp, supra note 305.  But these laws are integral to supported decision-making legislation.  And, 
a third party does not even have to know of the existence of a supported decision-making agreement 
to contact protective services if they suspect that the principal is being harmed.   
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States like Wisconsin, where the supported decision-making agreement form 
does not contain this warning, should add this information to the form.  Re-
vising the form to move the warning to the top may also provide additional 
protection. 
There are other safeguards that could be added to supported decision-
making laws to further reduce the likelihood of harm to persons with demen-
tia from supported decision-making agreements and practices.  For example, 
people who agree to be supporters could be mandated to undergo training 
about their duties to the principal and how best to provide support.327  Also, 
some scholars have proposed building in opportunities to seek the dissent of 
the principal in the supported decision-making process,328 which could fur-
ther function as a safeguard.  Moreover, principals could be advised to have 
multiple supporters who could serve to check any abuses or pressure of other 
supporters.329 
Additionally, in some jurisdictions with supported decisionmaking, 
such as different provinces in Canada, supporters are monitored.330  Just as 
guardians should be monitored for how they handle the accounts of their 
wards to ensure that they are not financially exploiting people they are sup-
posed to be protecting,331 it may be beneficial to likewise monitor supporters.  
Monitors would “make reasonable efforts to determine whether the [sup-
porter] is complying with their legal duties.”332  If a supporter is not comply-
ing, the monitor could ask a court to order the supporter to comply or to re-
move the supporter. 
In sum, while risk of harm to persons with dementia will not be elimi-
nated entirely, safeguards in supported decision-making legislation may help 
assuage fears that this decision-making model will result in more harm than 
surrogate decisionmaking.333 
                                                          
 327.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1144.  Current books targeted to caregivers of persons with 
dementia focus on how to be a good caregiver and surrogate decisionmaker, but could be revised to 
include content on how to be a good supporter.  See CASTLEMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 219–59. 
 328.  Dana Howard & Allison McCarthy, Presentation at 21st Annual Conference of the Amer-
ican Society of Bioethics and Humanities: Supported Decision Making: Nondomination Rather 
Than Mental Prosthesis (Oct. 26, 2019). 
 329.  KENNY, supra note 36, at 54. 
 330.  See MICHAEL BACH & LANA KERZNER, LAW COMM’N OF ONT., A NEW PARADIGM FOR 
PROTECTING AUTONOMY AND THE RIGHT TO LEGAL CAPACITY (2010); Kohn et al., supra note 13, 
at 1144; Salzman, supra note 73, at 173 (recommending use of monitors); Shih-Ning Then, Evolu-
tion and Innovation in Guardianship Laws: Assisted Decision-Making, 35 SYDNEY L. REV. 133, 
160–62 (2013).   
 331.  PECK & LAW, supra note 12, at 290. 
 332.  BACH & KERZNER, supra note 330, at 118. 
 333.  The alternative is to deny persons with dementia the ability to make healthcare choices.  
Some may agree that denying persons with disabilities the freedom to so choose is worth it because 
their medical wellbeing and life are safeguarded.  See, e.g., Bickenbach, supra note 324, at 126, 
129.  But I weigh autonomy more heavily, and assert that the cost of privileging autonomy is some-
times going to be medical wellbeing and life.  
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D.  Possibility of “Bad” Decisions Does Not Outweigh Benefits of 
Retaining Legal Capacity 
Another significant concern with shifting from use of surrogates is that 
allowing persons with dementia to make their own decisions may mean that 
they decide in a manner inconsistent with what others consider to be their 
best interests.  That is, allowing persons with dementia the freedom to decide 
may result in a “bad” decision.334 
Indeed, experts have identified the tension between “safety and free-
dom” as a significant ethical concern for persons with dementia,335 and have 
noted that, “allowing or even encouraging a person with cognitive or intel-
lectual disability to ‘learn from mistakes’ may undermine efforts to protect 
that person from harmful outcomes.”336  Also, some may find it cruel not to 
limit the agency of persons with cognitive impairments because if permitted 
to make their own decisions, they may suffer.337 
The preceding discussion assumes it is possible to determine what is 
best for someone else.338  But there are conceptual issues in defining and 
evaluating the quality of decisions, and determining whether a particular de-
cision is good or bad.339  In the healthcare context, questions about the quality 
of decisions and what is in someone’s best interests are typically never raised 
if there is agreement between the physician and patient on a course of action.  
When there is disagreement, however, the physician may find the patient to 
be incapacitated, which allows the patient’s will to be overridden without 
evaluating the quality of physician’s, surrogate’s, or patient’s decisions.340 
                                                          
 334.  See Bruce Jennings, Freedom Fading: On Dementia, Best Interests, and Public Safety, 35 
GA. L. REV. 593 (2001) (describing justifications for infringing the liberty of persons with dementia 
in terms of preventing harm to self and others).  Bad decisions may also be decisions that others 
consider to be odd or weird, even if there is no risk of harm. 
 335.  POWELL, supra note 4, at 161, 167, 204, 213, 235, 237; WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 
27, at 47; see also Fetherstonehaugh et al., supra note 61, at 143 (describing potential conflicts 
between autonomy and wellbeing).   
  If wellbeing is not defined solely in medical terms, however, such conflicts may be elimi-
nated.  Alicia Hall, supra note 143, at 385 (“[P]atients are generally concerned with not just their 
physical but also their overall well-being when pursuing medical care . . . .”).  Indeed, scholars have 
noted that autonomy and safety are not always in tension.  Fineman, supra note 323. 
 336.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1142.  These experts assert that legislatures have responsi-
bility for deciding what the balance between these values should be.  Id.   
 337.  Some facilities where persons with dementia live take the view that freedom is worth some 
risks of harm, however.  Larissa MacFarquhar, The Comforting Fictions of Dementia Care, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/08/the-comforting-fic-
tions-of-dementia-care.  But see Behrens, supra note 108. 
 338.  HERRING, supra note 72, at 3. 
 339.  When discussing how to evaluate supported decisionmaking, scholars have noted that stud-
ying the quality of decisions is not possible without agreement on what a good decision is.  Hall, 
supra note 81, at 340; Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1141–43.   
 340.  Indeed, “[a] discrepancy between the person with dementia’s view and that of [others] may 
in some instances be as much to do with [others’] biases and assumptions . . . as with lack of aware-
ness on the part of the person with dementia.”  Woods & Pratt, supra note 62, at 426. 
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For persons with dementia, there may be danger that if they disagree 
with others, they will be deemed to lack decision-making capacity, even if 
under current capacity standards they could make their own decisions.341  In-
deed, a person with dementia may understand and prefer an option that ap-
pears to others to be suboptimal, but is actually an informed preference meant 
to further their interests, idiosyncratic as they are likely to be. 
Given that capacitated individuals are routinely prevented from making 
their own healthcare decisions in current clinical practice,342 arguments 
against supported decisionmaking on the basis of a possible negative impact 
on the person with dementia may be motivated by a desire to ensure that the 
person with dementia only has options that others, such as family members 
or healthcare providers, agree are good.  This is because beneficence may be 
more highly valued than autonomy,343 and there is an inclination to protect 
persons with dementia to the point of denying them the right to make their 
own decisions. 
Respect for autonomy should trump beneficence, however, especially 
because the overall benefits of self-determination and relational deci-
sionmaking may outweigh any negative effect of one “bad” decision.  Indeed, 
research has demonstrated there are psychological benefits for persons with 
dementia and their families when they are involved in decisionmaking.344  
Additionally, there are also psychological benefits to supporters because 
when people collaborate in decisionmaking, they share the burdens of deci-
sionmaking.  Under the surrogate decision-making model, surrogates may 
feel distress about their decisions.345  If a person eligible to be a surrogate is 
instead a supporter, there may be less stress and distress because their role 
and responsibility is not to decide for, but instead to provide decision-making 
assistance to, the person with dementia.  Moreover, supporters will have 
agreed in advance of a decision to provide support in contrast to many surro-
gates who find themselves in the position of needing to decide for another 
with no notice, and this may also alleviate stress. 
Furthermore, everyone faces the possibility of suffering from their de-
cisions, regardless of their disability status, which raises questions about why 
only persons with decisional impairments have their liberty restricted.  In-
deed, scholars have pointed out that competent persons sometimes may be 
                                                          
 341.  Id. at 428 (“Problems arise where the person with dementia does not share others’ views 
of their competencies, or does not accede compliantly to their views.”).  When risks are assessed 
differently, others may override the autonomy of the person with dementia.  Id. at 424. 
 342.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1153. 
 343.  Eltis, supra note 314, at 433–35; Woods & Pratt, supra note 62, at 424.   
 344.  Miller et al., supra note 8, at 1152–53 (“[F]amily carers have better quality of life, less 
depression, less negative strain . . . . For persons with dementia, being a part of the decision-making 
process may hold a grander meaning of validating their very existence or personhood, regardless of 
the outcome or who makes the final decision.”).  
 345.  INST. OF MED., supra note 276, at 129, 137–39 (reviewing research). 
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worse off when they exercise their autonomy and make decisions seeking to 
effect their values.346  This is because of background structural conditions or 
interpersonal relationships that restrict their set of possible choices,347 incom-
plete information, and cognitive biases.348  But people without cognitive im-
pairments are typically not prevented from deciding for themselves, based on 
the theory that they are best positioned to know what is good for them.  De-
spite the reality that people often do not make good decisions, they are al-
lowed to do so.  If persons with disabilities are to be treated equally, then 
their autonomy and self-determination must be respected349 even if “bad” de-
cisions result.  Supported decisionmaking, where assistance is provided in 
making decisions, may temper concerns about bad decisions and cruel out-
comes, however. 
In conclusion, fears that supported decisionmaking will lead to bad de-
cisions are not sufficient justification for denying persons with dementia 
agency.  The current practice of marginalizing or excluding persons with de-
mentia from healthcare decisionmaking, and relying on surrogates, is a guar-
anteed dignitary harm, which leads to a documented decrease in wellbeing.350  
Not preventing persons with dementia from making or participating in 
healthcare decisions could possibly result in harm (e.g., physical) and de-
creased wellbeing, but this is not guaranteed.  On balance, if ensuring well-
being of persons with dementia is the goal, then they should not be prevented 
from making their own decisions.351  
                                                          
 346.  Hawkins, supra note 4, at 514. 
 347.  NEDELSKY, supra note 133, at 169; Donnelly, supra note 249, at 279; Harding, supra note 
316, at 382; Sherwin, supra note 24, at 13–14. 
 348.  KAHNEMAN, supra note 128; SCHNEIDER, supra note 61, at 144–45; THALER & SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 128, at 23–37. 
 349.  See Bickenbach, supra note 324, at 123, 129 (discussing importance of equality of auton-
omy and arguing that to safeguard life and wellbeing of persons with disabilities, some individual’s 
autonomy may need to be sacrificed); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, From Integrationism to Equal 
Protection: tenBroek and the Next 25 Years of Disability Rights, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 13 (2016) 
(arguing for the principle of equality to be applied to persons with disabilities); Sean M. Scott, 
Contractual Incapacity and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 124 DICKINSON L. REV. (forth-
coming 2020) (arguing against mental incapacity doctrines in contract law because they discrimi-
nate against persons with disabilities who should be treated equally under the law). 
 350.  See SABAT, supra note 132, at 181 (describing the positive benefits of promoting agency 
in persons with dementia and negative effects on quality of life when persons with dementia do not 
have a sense of agency); supra Section I.C; see also Mallers et al., supra note 152, at 68–69 (de-
scribing how when older persons remain in control, they have enhanced wellbeing). 
 351.   Bruce Jennings, Rethinking Dementia Care in Ethics and the Law, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. 
L.J. 398, 410 (2010) (“[T]he principle that curtailing agency in dementia for the sake of safety, 
comfort, or expediency is not the path of morally responsible care giving or prudent public policy.  
Agency and selfhood of any kind eventually fade all too rapidly in the face of dementia.  Let us not 
hasten their demise prematurely.”).  
  Supporters therefore should not be permitted to override the healthcare decision of the per-
son with dementia, which is permissible under supported decision-making law in some other juris-
dictions.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1121.  Importantly, the effect on third parties of a person 
with dementia’s decision is still important to consider.  Some decisions a person with dementia can 
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E.  Dementia, Precedent Autonomy, and Personal Identity 
The onset of dementia raises significant questions about precedent au-
tonomy and personal identity.  In contrast to some other cognitive disabilities, 
such as Down Syndrome or autism, in which the person with the disability 
may never have been considered autonomous because they were born with 
cognitive impairments and for which there is no disruption in personal iden-
tity, many persons with dementia previously were viewed as capable and au-
tonomous individuals.352  And, unlike other disabilities that affect cognition 
where capacity will remain relatively constant (e.g., developmental disabil-
ity) or may fluctuate with some predictability (e.g., mental illness), dementia 
is degenerative and capacity can be expected to decline over time.  Both of 
these attributes of dementia lead to questions about the role of changed pref-
erences, who the appropriate decisionmaker is, and what standard of deci-
sionmaking should be used. 
1.  Precedent Autonomy and Changed Preferences 
An individual’s preferences and interests may change after they acquire 
dementia,353 which raises philosophical, ethical, and legal questions.354  The 
existing scholarly literature about these questions tends to focus on how de-
cisions should be made on behalf of persons with dementia in light of 
changed preferences, and overlooks the possibility that a person with demen-
tia could make their own decisions at the time a decision must be made.355 
                                                          
make, such as expressing a preference to continue to drive, may justifiably be overridden due to 
concerns about harm to others.  POWELL, supra note 4, at 242–43.  While others may have an interest 
in the healthcare decisions of a person with dementia, the effects of most such decisions are inter-
nalized to the person with dementia and thus should be respected.  But see Robert A. Burt, The End 
of Autonomy, 35 HASTINGS CTR. SPECIAL REP., Nov.–Dec. 2005, at S9, S12 (describing other’s 
interests in a patient’s decisionmaking).  In brief, there are costs to respecting autonomy, such as a 
decline in medical wellbeing or negative externalities.  See supra note 333.  Those costs do not 
outweigh the benefits, however.   
 352.  See Diller, supra note 11, at 525.  If a person with dementia also has a developmental or 
intellectual disability, however, they may never have been considered autonomous.   
 353.  Jaworska, supra note 4, at 108.  There may be no discernable conflict between past and 
present preferences, however.  See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 4, at 14–16 (describing example of 
consistent healthcare preferences, despite presence of dementia). 
 354.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 27, at 47 (noting that one ethical issue relating to de-
mentia is “balancing a person’s previous views and values with current ones”). 
 355.  Recent proposals for changing decision-making practices for persons with dementia typi-
cally do not challenge the use of surrogates.  Instead, the proposals change surrogate decisionmaking 
to incorporate elements of both substituted judgment and best interests standards to allow for pref-
erences to change over time without ignoring precedent autonomy, and also to include the person 
with dementia in the decision-making process to some extent.  Wilkins, supra note 102, at 1017–
18, 1020; see also Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Decision-Making for Incapacitated Elders: A “Ther-
apeutic Interests” Standard, 33 INT’L J. LAW & PSYCHIATRY 369, 369 (2010) (arguing for recon-
ceptualizing best interests as broader than medical best interests and setting a minimum standard of 
what will promote a therapeutic end). 
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Some legal philosophers, such as Professor Ronald Dworkin, argue that 
respect for autonomy requires respect for the interests and decisions of the 
person when competent because only those were autonomous.356  Professor 
Dworkin argues that wishes prior to the onset of dementia are dispositive to 
decisionmaking because a person’s interests in how their experience with de-
mentia fits into the narrative of their life as a fully competent and autonomous 
person is a critical interest (i.e., judgments about what makes a life good), 
which trumps mere experiential interests (e.g., any pleasure the person with 
dementia may experience).357 
Those who agree with Professor Dworkin argue that a person with im-
paired decision-making abilities as a result of dementia 
can make (mere) choices, but because the individual does not have 
the capacity to engage in the underlying process of deliberation that 
gives rise to genuine decisions, those choices are disconnected 
from his or her autonomous self.  Giving the fullest possible effect 
to such an individual’s autonomy in these circumstances requires 
giving effect to the decisions that the individual would have made 
if capable of making decisions . . . .358 
Not all persons with dementia lack the capacity to deliberate, however, 
especially those in the early stages of dementia.  Indeed, even scholars who 
in a Dworkinean vein argue for use of advance directives, which reflect ear-
lier decisions, to hasten death in the event of dementia admit that a dementia 
diagnosis does not necessarily mean a person lacks decisional capacity.359  
Further, as discussed previously, there are significant questions about the ex-
tent to which persons without cognitive impairments make autonomous de-
cisions.360 
Other legal scholars, such as Professor Rebecca Dresser, argue that di-
rectives written prior to the onset of dementia should not be followed when 
they conflict with the person’s current interests.361  Professor Dresser ex-
plains that trying to guess one’s future preferences and memorializing this in 
                                                          
 356.  DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 218–29; see also Jesse Wall, Being and Being Lost: Personal 
Identity and Dementia, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA, supra note 11, at 327, 335 (describ-
ing Professor Dworkin’s view of critical and experiential interests). 
 357.  DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 199–208; see also Hawkins, supra note 4, at 510–11 (discussing 
Professor Dworkin’s views). 
 358.  Hall, supra note 81, at 339.  Other scholars also note that autonomy requires certain cog-
nitive abilities.  Schindler & Waksman, supra note 58, at 352.  Still other scholars argue that auton-
omy is the capacity to value rather than capacity to deliberate or “be fully in charge of one’s life.”  
Jaworska, supra note 4, at 126. 
 359.  Menzel & Steinbock, supra note 5, at 492 (describing a man with dementia who could not 
write, but could, with assistance, convey his thoughts). 
 360.  See supra Section II.A. 
 361.  Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients, supra note 3, at 404–05; see also Menzel 
& Chandler-Cramer, supra note 39, at 28 (discussing when prior wishes should be followed in terms 
of a sliding scale). 
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an advance directive is problematic because one cannot know what one will 
want in the future.362 
And, in fact, preferences, interests, and value judgments often do change 
when one develops a disability.363  This is in part because persons without 
disabilities, including clinicians, do not accurately estimate the quality of life 
of persons of disabilities,364 rating it lower than persons with disabilities re-
port365 and lower than they themselves report after they later acquire a disa-
bility.366  Additionally, after becoming cognitively impaired, “what was once 
of extreme importance . . . no longer matters, while things that were previ-
ously of little moment assume much greater significance.”367 
If preferences change after capacity is lost, a person with dementia may 
be unable to change their mind and act on their present interests because 
someone else has become the legal decisionmaker, or because their written 
instructions, which they may not remember or that express values they no 
longer care about, are considered legally binding.368  That is, their former self 
binds their present self.369  Professor Dresser thus prefers the best interests 
decision-making standard for persons with dementia.370 
If persons with dementia used supported decisionmaking, it is unknown 
whether their decisions would match their former or current preferences and 
                                                          
 362.  Advance directives cannot anticipate all future scenarios one might face and one’s prefer-
ences in each.  POWELL, supra note 4, at 214; Dresser, Precommitment, supra note 3, at 1829–37; 
Wilkins, supra note 102, at 1017. 
 363.  Sinoff & Blaja-Lisnic, supra note 61, at 101. 
 364.  See Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1141 n.122 (discussing problems with affective forecast-
ing, especially when imagining life with a disability); Wright, supra note 251, at 27–28 (discussing 
quality of life of persons with dementia). 
 365.  David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Dis-
crimination against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 69 (1996). 
 366.  Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis? 10 MED. DECISION MAKING 
58, 66 (1990). 
 367.  Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions 
for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 234, 
236 (1989). 
 368.  Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients, supra note 3, at 379–81. 
 369.  Dresser, Precommitment, supra note 3, at 1825.  Expressing different wishes after one ac-
quires a cognitive impairment may constitute a revocation of an advance directive, in which case 
precommitment would not be a problem.  The UHCDA expressly considers revocation of an ad-
vance directive.  UHCDA, supra note 2, at § 3; see also Callahan, supra note 150, at 26 (“We would 
do well to be suspicious of such earlier declarations when the evidence before our eyes is that of a 
patient doing reasonably well and not obviously seeking death.”). 
 370.  Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients, supra note 3, at 374.  Other scholars also 
argue for use of the best interests standard.  Woods & Pratt, supra note 62, at 428.  For a defense of 
Dresser’s privileging of current interests over prior wishes in terms of autonomy rather than best 
interests, see Ells, supra note 133, at 613. 
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interests.  But supported decisionmaking would ensure that a person with de-
mentia could agentically decide to further what they view as their current best 
interest and would not be bound to former preferences.371 
2.  Dementia, Numerical Identity, and Decisionmaking 
When a person acquires dementia, questions arise about whether they 
are the same person as before they had dementia.372  Dementia, unlike many 
other disabilities, involves “[a] long process of personality changes—which 
may affect the validity of the patient’s prior wishes and advanced direc-
tives.”373 
This issue is often referred to in terms of numerical personal identity.374  
If dementia causes identity to change, to the point that the individual may no 
longer be the same person,375 then how should advance directives be consid-
ered?  This question is deeper than those dealing with what to do in the case 
of changed preferences after the loss of decisional capacity.  As a general 
matter, people do not decide what happens to other’s bodies, unless they have 
special moral or legal authority.  Under this principle, it is not clear why a 
stranger who happened to inhabit the same body as the person with dementia 
                                                          
 371.  See POWELL, supra note 4, at 14–16 (describing case of woman with severe dementia 
whose healthcare preferences remained strong and consistent); see also John K. Davis, Precedent 
Autonomy and Subsequent Consent, 7 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 267 (2004) (discussing 
resolution preferences that dictate whether to respect precedent autonomy or current preferences);  
Jaworska, supra note 4, at 126 (describing how receiving assistance in living “according to [one’s] 
convictions and values” is not inconsistent with autonomy). 
 372.  Some persons with dementia believe themselves to be a different person after the onset of 
their illness.  For example, one person with dementia told researchers, “I hope we’re not going to 
discuss the past much, because I’m no longer the person that I was then.”  Yale & Snyder, supra 
note 291, at 234.  Family members may think the person with dementia is fundamentally the same.  
CASTLEMAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 11. 
 373.  Golan, supra note 71, at 415–16.  Other brain-based disabilities may affect personality and 
identity in similar ways, however.  And arguably identity changes throughout the life course regard-
less of whether one becomes disabled.  Woods & Pratt, supra note 62, at 428. 
 374.  See Allen Buchanan, Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem, 17 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 277, 280 (1988) (discussing identity in terms of “psychological continuity”); Elisabeth 
Furberg, Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What is the Problem?, 37 J. MED. & PHIL. 60, 
61 (2012) (assessing the moral relevance of “psychological continuity” for following advance di-
rectives).  This is also known as the “someone else” problem.  David Degrazia, Advance Directives, 
Dementia, and “The Someone Else Problem,” 13 BIOETHICS 373, 373 (1999).  For recent experi-
mental scholarship on the issue of dementia and numerical identity, see Stephen R. Latham & Brian 
Earp, Presentation at 21st Annual Conference of the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities: 
Experimental Philosophy and Advance Directives in Dementia, (Oct. 24, 2019). 
 375.  Wall, supra note 356, at 372 (describing identity over time as numerical identity).  Some 
bioethicists argue, however, that there is numerical identity between the person pre- and post-de-
mentia.  NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, DEMENTIA: ETHICAL ISSUES xviii (2009). 
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should get to make decisions for what will happen to that body at a later date 
when occupied by a different person.376 
Supported decisionmaking provides a solution to this conceptual and 
ethical problem.  If the person before the onset of dementia is not the same 
as the person after dementia, then the current preferences and interests of the 
person with dementia should be the only considerations in decisionmaking, 
and supported decisionmaking would facilitate decisionmaking on these ba-
ses.  If the person before the onset of dementia is the same as the person after 
dementia, then retaining decision-making authority permits the person to ei-
ther make decisions consistent with their prior wishes, or to change their 
mind.377  One does not have to know the answer to the question of whether 
there is numerical identity pre- and post-dementia because supported deci-
sionmaking is appropriate regardless of the answer. 
3.  Dementia, Personhood, and Decisionmaking 
There are also questions about whether someone with dementia retains 
any identity (or personhood) throughout the experience of illness.  Philoso-
phers have analyzed the qualitative component of personal identity in this 
context.  If identity is viewed as consisting of cognitive abilities, then when 
cognitive abilities change or decline, identity so too changes and may even 
constitute a “loss of self.”378  This leads to a debate about whether a person 
with dementia can act as a subject379 or is acted upon as an object, perhaps 
owed “duties of benevolence and dignity,” but not a recognition of auton-
omy.380 
Persons with dementia may feel a loss of personhood when interacting 
with others who assume they are incapable and attempt to assert their status 
as persons who can still make their own decisions.  As one woman at an AD 
support group commented, “We will talk about it.  I will listen, but you must 
talk with me about it so that I can make an informed decision—it’s my deci-
sion.”381  Another woman with AD conveyed, “I still would like to be treated 
like a person, you know, because I’m still a person whether I do it wrong or 
                                                          
 376.  See Wilkins, supra note 102, at 1018 (arguing that in these circumstances, following an 
advance directive or making a substituted judgment is like “asking an unrelated stranger to ulti-
mately make the decision”).  As some have argued, as psychological continuity decreases, the moral 
force of the advance directive weakens.  Buchanan, supra note 374, at 301.  Others find this entire 
argument unpersuasive and argue that the focus should not be on identity but on efficacy of proposed 
medical treatment.  POWELL, supra note 4, at 257–58; Davis, supra note 4, at 747. 
 377.  This would be considered a revocation of their advance directive. 
 378.  Wall, supra note 356, at 329, 334, 336; see also CASTLEMAN ET AL., supra note 31.  Or 
constitute a “mere self” with no personhood.  Degrazia, supra note 374, at 389–90.  But see MacFar-
quhar, supra note 337 (“Why should a person be defined by thoughts and memories?  Aren’t emo-
tions and bodies enough?”). 
 379.  Wall, supra note 356, at 330. 
 380.  Id. at 333. 
 381.  Snyder, supra note 91, at 120. 
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right.”382  And a support group participant newly diagnosed with AD asked, 
“Will I soon not be a person anymore?”383 
If personal identity is instead viewed as a relationship between an indi-
vidual and the external world,384 or as anything other than cognitive abilities 
such as the “capacity to feel emotions,”385 a person with dementia may retain 
personal identity and remain the subject of their lives.386  Persons with de-
mentia can use supported decision-making agreements that declare they have 
the right to make their own decisions as a means to assert their personhood. 
On a concluding note, some scholars assert that both numerical identity 
and personhood remain largely intact over the course of dementia, and that 
any changes are due to how others construct the significance of dementia.387  
If this is the case, then interventions, such as supported decisionmaking, that 
alter how others interact with a person with dementia may obviate concern 
about changes to personal identity. 
F.  More Research on Supported Decisionmaking Is Needed 
Much is unknown about the practice and effects of supported deci-
sionmaking.  As the authors of an article reviewing studies of supported de-
cisionmaking conclude, “[T]here is almost no evidence as to how decisions 
are actually made in supported decision-making relationships; the effect of 
such relationships on persons in need of decision-making assistance; or the 
quality of the decisions that result.”388  Because of this absence of infor-
mation about supported decisionmaking, it is impossible to know conclu-
sively whether this model accomplishes the goal of promoting self-determi-
nation for persons with disabilities.389  But given the importance of respect 
                                                          
 382.  Id. at 116. 
 383.  Yale & Snyder, supra note 291, at 235. 
 384.  Wall, supra note 356, at 329; see also HERRING, supra note 72, at 12, 59 (describing iden-
tity and relationships); Harding, supra note 316, at 381 (describing relationality compared to auton-
omy). 
 385.  KITWOOD, supra note 43, at 7; POWELL, supra note 4, at 221. 
 386.  Indeed, recent scholarship has argued that communication and relationships are what con-
stitute personhood and “enable people with dementia to be actively engaged for as long as possible 
as primary decision makers about the course of their lives.”  Wilkins, supra note 84, at 638; see also 
Jennings, supra note 137 (discussing relationships, personhood, and remaining agency and identity 
of persons with dementia); Jennings, supra note 62 (arguing that relationships can preserve the per-
sonhood of persons with dementia); Jennings, supra note 334, at 614–15; Wall, supra note 356, at 
333. 
 387.  KITWOOD, supra note 43, at 44–58, 64–77, 78–82 (discussing how others undermine the 
personhood of persons with dementia and how personhood can be maintained); Sabat, supra note 
85, at 90; Series, supra note 86, at 106 (“[I]t is often not so much the impairment itself, but the 
response of society around the person that creates much of the misery and suffering of dementia.”); 
see also SABAT, supra note 132, at 137–49 (describing selfhood and dementia); STEVEN R. SABAT, 
THE EXPERIENCE OF ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE: LIFE THROUGH A TANGLED VEIL (2001). 
 388.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1114. 
 389.  Id. 
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for autonomy and the potential for increased wellbeing when law aligns with 
people’s preferences, supported decisionmaking is worth adopting into law. 
Moreover, while the empirical research on supported decisionmaking is 
very limited,390 there is more information from another type of relational de-
cision-making model, shared decisionmaking, which can be useful in draw-
ing inferences about supported decisionmaking.391  Shared decisionmaking 
occurs when a patient and physician decide together on a particular 
healthcare decision.  The patient describes their values and preferences, and 
the physician offers recommendations based on their medical expertise in 
light of their patient’s values.392  This model is meant to promote patient au-
tonomy while providing support in the decision-making process,393 similar to 
the goal of supported decisionmaking. 
The available research on shared decisionmaking for a variety of patient 
populations demonstrates that many patients desire this form of decisionmak-
ing, but physicians do not engage in it as a matter of routine practice.394  Other 
research has revealed that the degree to which patients find shared deci-
sionmaking valuable depends on the type of decision and the patient’s age,395 
and that a significant number of people prefer not to actively make healthcare 
decisions, instead deferring to their physician.396  The research is unclear 
whether shared decisionmaking leads to better outcomes,397 but suggests that 
this model does not lead to worse outcomes.398 
Despite the lack of knowledge about the practice of supported deci-
sionmaking, there are reasons to adopt it into legislation.  This model has 
symbolic appeal because it provides legal support for the capabilities and 
self-determination of persons with disabilities, including dementia, and there 
                                                          
 390.  For a recent review of the literature on supported decision making, see Karrie A. Shogren 
et al., Supported Decision Making: A Synthesis of the Literature Across Intellectual Disability, Men-
tal Health, and Aging, 52 EDUC. & TRAINING IN AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 144 
(2017).  
 391.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1146–48. 
 392.  INST. OF MED., supra note 276, at 166–67; Dan W. Brock, The Ideal of Shared Decision 
Making Between Physicians and Patients, 1 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 28, 28 (1991); Kohn et al., 
supra note 13, at 1147; Sinoff & Blaja-Lisnic, supra note 61, at 97–98. 
 393.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1147–48. 
 394.  INST. OF MED., supra note 276, at 351.  Some have suggested that financial incentives 
might motivate physicians to engage in greater shared decisionmaking.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, 
at 1153.  But see Wright, supra note 299. 
 395.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1149–50. 
 396.  Id. at 1150; Sinoff & Blaja-Lisnic, supra note 61, at 98. 
 397.  Kohn et al., supra note 13, at 1151–52. 
 398.  Id. at 1152.  There is a lack of research on shared decisionmaking with patients who have 
cognitive disabilities.  Id. at 1148–49.  But if the findings from the wider shared decision-making 
literature apply to supported decisionmaking for persons with dementia, then one would expect that 
1) some patients with dementia will opt out of decisionmaking entirely based on individual prefer-
ences and 2) that engaging in supported healthcare decisionmaking would not cause harm. 
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is no evidence of concrete harm from its use.399  Conducting more research 
on supported decisionmaking remains important, however.400  
V.  CONCLUSION 
As some scholars have observed, “Too often, it appears, we take the 
limitations imposed on the liberties and dignity of those with dementia for 
granted, as a presumed natural consequence of their degenerating health and 
our well-intentioned but paternalistic desire to ensure their medical well-be-
ing.”401  These presumptions are embedded in healthcare decision-making 
laws, policies, and practices, all of which permit others to decide for a person 
with a decisional impairment such as dementia. 
The rise in the number of persons living with dementia means that sur-
rogate healthcare decision-making laws will impact more people, and it is 
thus imperative to examine whether these laws respect autonomy and pro-
mote wellbeing.  Some argue that advance directives and surrogate decisions 
based on substituted judgments adequately respect (prior) autonomy.  This 
Article instead argues that institutionalizing supported decisionmaking, a 
model found in disability and guardianship law, would best respect the exer-
cise of (current) autonomy of many persons with dementia and would also 
enhance their wellbeing. 
The underlying rationale for surrogate decisionmaking for persons with 
dementia is that only autonomous persons are entitled to make their own 
healthcare decisions.  Persons who are not autonomous are entitled only to 
beneficence or respect for precedent autonomy.  This rationale relies on the 
assumption that persons with dementia are not, by virtue of their disability, 
autonomous.  This Article argues, however, that many persons with dementia 
are in fact capable of autonomy. 
Autonomy as understood by many philosophers, clinicians, and legal 
actors is a fiction.402  Behavioral economics literature demonstrates, for ex-
ample, that people often do not decide rationally because their decisionmak-
ing is distorted by various cognitive biases.  Sociological and philosophical 
                                                          
 399.  Terry Carney, Participation and Services Access Rights for People with Intellectual Disa-
bility: A Role for Law?, 38 J. INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY 59, 62 (2013). 
 400.  If used for persons with dementia, it would be particularly important to know whether sup-
ported decisionmaking resulted in perceptions of increased agency and wellbeing for persons with 
dementia compared to surrogate decisionmaking.  Additionally, it will be important to identify bar-
riers to implementation, and so it is also important to know what healthcare providers and family 
members think of supported decisionmaking and whether they can identify ways to improve the 
model.  See KAPP, supra note 73, at vii–viii (describing how the effects of laws are unknown, but 
should be known). 
 401.  Eltis, supra note 314, at 433. 
 402.  See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 23, at 104 (defining autonomous decisions as 
intentional and voluntary, and made with understanding). 
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scholarship also demonstrates that people cannot be truly autonomous be-
cause the set of choices from which decisions are made is limited by struc-
tural conditions or through interactions with others.403  Other scholarship has 
focused on the special setting and nature of medical decisionmaking, high-
lighting that people are sick, afraid, and do not understand the complexity of 
proposed medical interventions, which suggests that autonomous deci-
sionmaking is especially difficult in this context. 
Given this, some have argued that privileging autonomy in healthcare 
decisionmaking has been a failure and that other principles, such as hard pa-
ternalism or considering effects on third parties, should be emphasized in-
stead.  I disagree.  Respect for bodily integrity in the healthcare setting is of 
utmost importance, and respect for autonomy may be the best way to respect 
a patient’s bodily integrity.  Further, deemphasizing autonomy may dispro-
portionately harm persons with disabilities who have long struggled to be 
respected as persons and recognized as capable of self-determination.404  Fi-
nally, feeling autonomous can lead to increased wellbeing.405 
Instead, I argue for reconceptualizing autonomy to accord with deci-
sion-making reality.406  Decisionmaking for persons without cognitive im-
pairments who are presumed to be competent is, at best, autonomish.  Or, 
stated differently, decisionmaking is an exercise of agency rather than auton-
omy defined by its ideal type.407  When autonomy is understood as agency, 
it becomes much more difficult to justify the marginalization or exclusion of 
persons with MCI or mild dementia from healthcare decisionmaking.  This 
is because many such persons, despite their cognitive impairments, retain the 
ability to articulate their values,408 assert their preferences, and choose be-
tween healthcare options, just as persons without dementia can.  That is, per-
sons with MCI or mild dementia remain able to exercise their agency, if not 
prevented from doing so by well-intentioned physicians or family members.  
Applying the principle of equal respect for persons demands respecting the 
agency of persons with dementia, just as the agency of persons without de-
mentia is respected.409 
                                                          
 403.  Crossley, supra note 151, at 906–08. 
 404.  Id. at 909.  Additionally, many persons with disabilities do not trust that “all persons and 
institutions involved in those decisions will respect the experiences, values, and welfare of people 
with disabilities,” which is further reason to emphasize autonomy.  Id. at 897. 
 405.  SABAT, supra note 132, at 181; Mallers et al., supra note 152, at 68–69. 
 406.  See Ells, supra note 133, at 614 (“[A] new . . . conception of autonomy needs to be worked 
out that includes what has been learned from the experience of self . . . under conditions of disabil-
ity.”). 
 407.  See supra Section II.A. 
 408.  See Jaworska, supra note 4, at 109 (arguing that persons with dementia who have the ca-
pacity to value are able to be autonomous). 
 409.  Bickenbach, supra note 324, at 123 (“The fact of the social devaluation of the life of per-
sons with disabilities, as a matter of both attitude and practice, demands that the governing moral 
principle ought to be equality, and in particular equality of autonomy.”). 
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Relatedly, I have argued in past work for conceptualizing autonomy in 
late- and end-of-life decision-making law and policy as relational.410  Studies 
documenting decision-making preferences and practices in this context re-
veal that the exercise of autonomy is relational in two dimensions: deciding 
in consultation or collaboration with others and deciding, in part, on the basis 
of other’s interests.411  I continue this work in the present Article by arguing 
that persons with dementia should take advantage of supported decisionmak-
ing, which is inherently relational, as principals seek, and supporters provide, 
assistance with decisionmaking.  Supported decisionmaking also allows for 
principals, should they prefer, to act altruistically and decide on the basis of 
other’s interests.  In brief, supported decisionmaking aligns with how persons 
without cognitive impairments prefer to make important healthcare deci-
sions, formalizing what is often done informally, and is consistent with the 
practice of relational autonomy. 
Combining these insights, “autonomy” in healthcare decisionmaking is 
better described as agency, which is relational in practice.  Persons with mild 
to moderate dementia are capable of exercising relational agency when mak-
ing healthcare decisions, and this capability should be respected in law and 
clinical practice. 
Relying on supported rather than surrogate decision-making law ac-
cords with relational agency and is responsive to the preferences and interests 
of persons with dementia in remaining free to make their own decisions.  Sup-
ported decisionmaking thus may increase the wellbeing of this population.  
For these reasons, this model of decisionmaking should be adopted into law 
in all states and routinely used for persons with dementia. 
Expanding decision-making options is not the only change that should 
occur, however.  Future scholarship should focus on other changes necessary 
to fully expand autonomy and further increase wellbeing for persons with 
dementia as well as others making medical decisions in late life.412  Solving 
problems of access to quality long-term care is one such policy priority be-
cause not having such access affects the healthcare decisions that patients and 
families make.413  Indeed, this Article should not be read as absolving the 
state of its responsibilities to care for vulnerable populations,414 “[i]ndividu-
alizing a [s]ocial [p]roblem,”415 or privileging decision-making rights and le-
gal capacity over social and economic rights.416  As I have noted elsewhere, 
“Considering the generosity of the social safety net matters . . . [and] [w]hile 
                                                          
 410.  Wright, supra note 20, at 1066–68. 
 411.  Id. at 1093. 
 412.  Blank, supra note 50. 
 413.  POWELL, supra note 4, at 161, 167; Wright, supra note 20, at 1099 n.203. 
 414.  Fineman, supra note 323, at 98 (arguing that resources are needed to enhance autonomy).  
 415.  Dresser, Precommitment, supra note 3, at 1844–46. 
 416.  Kanter, supra note 74. 
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the focus of this paper has been mostly on the micro-level of decisionmak-
ing . . . it is also important to consider the macro-level conditions that influ-
ence autonomy.”417 
                                                          
 417.  Wright, supra note 20, at 1099 n.203. 
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